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Chapter 1
The State of the Amazon
The Amazon, home to the largest tropical forest on the planet, is an ir-replaceable natural asset with enormous biodiversity and a critically 
important component in global carbon and water cycles. The Pan Amazon, 
which includes the full watershed and the rainforests of the Guiana Shield, 
is a geopolitical territory spanning nine nations that have been entrusted 
with the stewardship of its natural resources (Figure 1.1).
Fifteen years ago, the prospects for conserving this globally impor-
tant natural asset were very much in doubt. Rampant deforestation driven 
by multiple social and economic phenomena threatened to transform its 
landscapes, degrade its aquatic resources and overwhelm its indigenous 
communities. Governments pursued construction of large-scale infrastruc-
ture projects as they sought to leverage unprecedented demand for global 
commodities with increased access to international financial markets. The 
resultant boom in economic activity motivated individuals and corpora-
tions to invest in business opportunities in the Amazon that progressively 
expanded the footprint of modern society. Climate scientists showed how 
a warmer planet would impact ecosystem function, as well as how a de-
forested landscape might disrupt moisture flows over the continent. The 
panorama was grim, and the combination of threats was referred to as A 
Perfect Storm in the Amazon Wilderness,1 borrowing a phrase from popular 
culture that described the destructive synergies between multiple forces 
of change. 
Fortunately, the citizens of the Amazonian nations were aware of the 
risk from uncontrolled development and demanded that their governments 
intervene to halt, or at the very least slow, the destruction. Concerned 
individuals from across the planet, in support of public and private con-
servation initiatives, joined them. The Pan Amazonian nations now boast 
the most extensive network of protected areas of any geographic region on 
Earth and have recognised the legal rights of indigenous communities by 
formalising their claims to ancestral lands. These two parallel efforts were 
doi: 10.3197/9781912186228.ch01
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implemented in a remarkably short span of time, reflecting the support 
of the area’s constituent populations and the capacity of global society to 
mobilise financial resources for environmental action and social justice. 
Simultaneously, a dramatic reduction in deforestation rates gave hope to 
advocates seeking systemic changes in development paradigms, particularly 
in Brazil, where the agribusiness sector reformed its production systems 
after recognising that its commercial interests were best served by improving 
its environmental performance.
CC BY 4.0 
Figure 1 .1: The Pan Amazon includes both the Amazon Ecoregion (green) and the 
Amazon Basin (blue). The southern boundary reflects Brazilian legislation governing 
fiscal and regulatory policy referred to as the Legal Amazon (tan). 
Data source: Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization.
The success of conservation initiatives and the decline in deforestation 
are essential for the long-term survival of the Amazon, but they have not 
changed the long-term trajectory of the Pan Amazon. Fully sixty per cent 
of the region remains open to non-sustainable activities, including logging, 
artisanal gold mining and settlement by small-scale farmers. Deforestation 
rates have crept upward across the region and registered historical highs 
in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Worse still, the predicted impacts of climate 
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change have manifested, in part due to increasing temperatures but, more 
ominously, by modifying precipitation regimes that threaten to tip the 
region – or at least its southern half – into a cataclysmic shift in ecosystem 
function that could lead to widespread forest dieback.2
Recent events, particularly the increase in forest fires and an election 
in Brazil, have placed Amazonian conservation once again in the forefront 
of the global media, which is now dominated by social networks that have 
succeeded in dramatising the issue at the local, national and international 
levels. Societies are demanding solutions, but these will be neither easy 
nor simple because the causes of environmental degradation in the Am-
azon are complex and span infrastructure, agriculture, minerals, finance 
and governance. Meaningful reform is impeded by the predominance of 
conventional business models, reinforced by deeply ingrained cultural 
attitudes, corruption, and inequality. The response to the COVID-19 pan-
demic exposed the inability of governments to safeguard their populations, 
particularly indigenous communities whose fear of disease is rooted in 
centuries of experience, as well as the rural and urban poor whose endemic 
exposure to infectious diseases and parasites increases the risk of mortality 
and morbidity.
Photograph © Rhett Butler, courtesy of Mongabay.
The Amazon is the world’s largest intact tropical forest wilderness . The Río Javari on 
the border between Peru and Brazil . 
The State of the Amazon
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Changing the development pathway of the Pan Amazon is like turn-
ing an ocean liner; steady pressure must be applied to the rudder of state 
over a long period in order to drive incremental change across multiple 
sectors of the regional economy. Regulation and market incentives that 
influence human behaviour and corporate decisions must be aligned with 
conservation outcomes so that sustainable development is less aspirational 
and more operational. This will require profound reforms in financial and 
commercial markets, as well as real change in regulatory systems and en-
hanced law enforcement. With few exceptions, sustainable models in forest 
and fisheries management have not yielded the economic returns needed to 
make them competitive with conventional extractive models. Even worse, 
the monetisation of ecosystem services has generated a mere fraction of 
the resources required to change human behaviour on the forest frontier, 
much less to subsidise the reforestation efforts that climate scientists view 
as essential for stabilising the hydrological regime of the Southern Amazon. 
This second edition of A Perfect Storm in the Amazon Wilderness pro-
vides an overview of the topics most relevant to the conservation of the 
region’s biodiversity, ecosystem services and indigenous cultures, as well 
as a description of the conventional and sustainable development models 
that are vying for space within the regional economy. Events of the last 
ten years are discussed in detail because future events will have to build 
upon – or modify – the cultural and economic forces driving events in the 
Pan Amazon. The text provides a longer historical perspective to show how 
policies create legacies that reverberate over decades, long after they have 
been recognised as being fundamentally flawed. 
Drivers of Environmental Degradation
Why do people clear forest? To anybody who has lived on the forest frontier, 
the answer is as simple as it is obvious: it is essential to the livelihoods of the 
region’s inhabitants. In some cases, it may be to grow food to feed a family 
but, more often, people clear forest to generate wealth by selling timber, 
cultivating a crop or raising livestock. The flow of goods between rural 
and urban societies is as old as civilisation, but in today’s global economy 
the connection between the producer and the consumer is mediated by a 
supply chain that is complex and not particularly transparent. For the last 
several decades, increases in demand for food and fibre have been met by 
the expansion of agricultural supply chains into tropical forest wilderness. 
Producers operating on these landscapes are responding to global demand 
for the goods they produce; they are acting in their own self-interest to 
create wealth for their families and jobs for their communities (Chapter 3). 
Many are fully aware that deforestation is a global problem but maintain 
5
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The production of beef cattle is the largest driver of deforestation and a mainstay of the 
rural economy in the Southern Amazon. Landholders clear forest on the forest frontier 
where land can be acquired via illegal or legal transactions . Over time, ranchers increase 
pasture area by clearing remnant forest, while improving productivity through grazing 
management, feed technology and animal genetics .
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that they should not bear the cost of conserving biodiversity or fighting 
global warming, especially when wealthy nations have sacrificed their 
own forest and polluted the atmosphere in pursuit of economic growth. A 
common refrain, voiced across economic spectra, is that wealthy nations 
should assume the cost of forest conservation. 
Many consumers in wealthy nations are concerned about tropical 
deforestation, and some express a willingness to pay for conservation meas-
ures. Nonetheless, many are unaware that the food they eat or the shampoo 
they use has been manufactured using products that originate from recently 
deforested landscapes. Consumers are isolated from producers by a host 
of middlemen, manufacturers and retailers, all of whom benefit from, and 
contribute to, the commercial forces that drive deforestation. Similarly, 
consumption of mineral commodities, such as iron ore, aluminum and 
petroleum, have contributed to the degradation of the forests and waters 
of the Amazon. The extractive industries impact the forest directly by oper-
ating mines and oil fields and indirectly when those facilities create access 
that opens the gateway for migration and the expansion of the agricultural 
frontier (Chapter 5). Financial institutions and individual investors who lend 
money or own shares in mining or petroleum corporations or agribusiness 
firms also share the responsibility for environmental degradation.
Deforestation is influenced enormously by the dynamics of rural real 
estate markets. Primary forest has value because its timber can be harvest-
ed for cash income but, once logged, land is referred to as ‘unproductive’ 
or as having ‘productive potential’. In contrast, pastures, plantations and 
cropland are considered to be ‘productive land’ because they generate 
revenue. This may seem perverse to an ecologist who understands the 
potential long-term productivity of a forest, but clearing land generates 
cash flow over the short term and adds value to real estate assets over the 
medium- and long-term (Chapter 4).
Public policies also foster deforestation. Most Amazonian countries 
have legal mechanisms for transferring public land to private individuals 
that explicitly allow – or even require – deforestation. Similarly, small-scale 
deforestation and the use of fire is either allowed or openly tolerated in 
almost all Amazonian jurisdictions. Local and regional governments, with 
the support of multilateral development agencies, build roads in wilderness 
landscapes where it is implicitly understood that land speculation will 
invariably lead to deforestation (Chapter 2). These policies remain in place 
because they enjoy the support of the economic interests of construction 
companies, landholders and agribusinesses, as well as the electoral power 
of landless peasants seeking a pathway out of poverty. Rhetoric supporting 
forest conservation is widespread, but acting to curtail deforestation is po-
litically perilous. The potential for a political movement to drive deforesta-
7
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tion is exemplified by the election of Jair Bolsonaro, who campaigned on a 
promise to reverse the conservation policies of the previous three decades. 
Culture also plays a role. Consider the pioneer who created a suc-
cessful farm over a lifetime of hard work and is understandably proud of 
that accomplishment. His or her children and grandchildren are likely to 
have similar views – even if they now also hold views supporting forest 
conservation. Frontier societies are populated with individuals who believe 
conventional development is beneficial, a life-view reinforced by educational 
systems and spiritual leaders (Chapter 6). 
Corruption is another obvious accelerant to the forces driving environ-
mental degradation. The Lava Jato scandals associated with the construction 
of public infrastructure projects revealed how graft* distorted economic 
feasibility studies for projects that might have been rejected based solely 
on financial criteria.† It is often assumed that improved governance will 
empower environmental advocates and slow deforestation, but initiatives 
to decentralise administrative processes place decisions in the hands of local 
politicians who tend to favour conventional business models (Chapter 7). 
Geographers and economists have created a classification system 
and lexicon to facilitate the discussion about the drivers of deforestation.3 
The term ‘proximate causes’ refers to those phenomena and actors directly 
responsible for deforestation; typically, these are on or near the landscape 
* In the US English sense of obtaining advantage through dishonest use of power.
† Lava Jato (car wash) refers to a corruption scandal involving large construction 
companies and politicians in Brazil, which eventually spread to involve con-
tracts and political leaders in the Andean Republics (Ch. 6).
© Dr. Morley Read/shutterstock.com.
Highways are deforestation vectors that improve access to previously remote areas, 
attracting settlers who clear land to establish farms and ranches . Road improvement 
is broadly supported by rural inhabitants because it facilitates commerce and increases 
land value . Aerial shot of an Amazonian highway in Ecuador and a clearing made by 
a subsistence farmer .
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Table 1 .1a: Proximate causes of environmental degradation
• Infrastructure Development
° Trunk highways 














° Industrial minerals 













Table 1 .1b: Indirect drivers and actors of environmental degradation
• Global demand for agricultural 
commodities
° Industrial crops: soy, beef, palm oil
° Cash crops: coffee, cocoa, sugar
° Timber, pulp, biofuels
° Illicit drugs
• National demand for basic food-
stuffs
° Protein: beef, dairy, poultry, 
° Staples: rice, manioc, fruit
• Global demand for mineral com-
modities
° Industrial metals






• National regulatory framework
° Food security and biofuel policies
° Land-use regulations 
° Decentralisation processes
° Environmental review systems 
° Inoperative judicial systems
° Regional development strategies
° Financial institutions
° Multilateral development agencies
° National development funds 
° Direct foreign investment 
° Domestic banks 
° Technical assistance and extension
° Public extension services 
° Grower associations 
° Alternative development (illicit 
drugs)
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being impacted by development (Table 1.1a). In many cases, there is an 
obvious link: cattle ranchers, for example, clear forest to expand pastures 
to raise beef. Sometimes there is a strong correlation but not a direct link: 
a new road cuts through a forest landscape, which opens access to settlers 
who spread out to establish homesteads. 
Conversely, economists use the term ‘indirect drivers’ to describe 
factors that occur at considerable distance from the forest frontier but create 
an economic force that motivates the behaviour of individuals in frontier 
society. These include markets where commodities are traded, regulatory 
agencies that oversee land use and policies intended to promote economic 
growth (Table 1.1b). Because the influence is both indirect and distant, it 
may be difficult to establish the connection between cause and effect. For 
example, certain varieties of elite coffee that originate in specific montane 
tropical localities have become popular in North America and Europe. 
Demand for these coffees creates a premium that is paid to growers from 
these regions, which motivates them to expand their production by clearing 
the patch of forest next to their coffee grove.
The use of these terms and the stratification of the causes of deforest-
ation may seem like an academic exercise with limited practical application, 
but it has been used to identify leverage points that can make supply chains 
more transparent and force intermediaries to modify their business practic-
es.4 Similarly, an evaluation of the drivers linked to regulatory frameworks 
or financial systems can identify the existence of perverse incentives that 
reward individuals or corporations that deforest land. Governments have 
recognised the need to reform laws, while multilateral agencies have em-
braced social and environmental standards that seek to avoid or mitigate 
the environmental impacts associated with their investments.5 
The interactions between markets, regulatory systems, technology 
and culture are by definition complex, which is why it has been so difficult 
to stop deforestation.6 Recent successes in reducing deforestation have been 
based on integrated approaches, which embrace the concept of incremental 
change and the need to involve all stakeholders with legitimate interests 
in the activities that cause, either directly or indirectly, the environmental 
degradation that threatens the Pan Amazon (Chapter 8).
The Geography of Environmental Degradation
The Pan Amazon spans approximately 825 million hectares, of which ap-
proximately ninety million hectares have been lost to deforestation; this 
corresponds to ~13% of the original forest cover (Table 1.2). At first glance, 
this percentage value might not seem alarming, particularly in the context 
of the total extant forest cover. However, cleared land is embedded within 
10
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Text Box 1.1: Human-Modified Landscapes
Forest frontiers are highway or river corridors that penetrate or are adjacent to 
wilderness landscapes; residents and immigrant pioneers exploit timber re-
sources and appropriate public lands by clearing forest to install low technology 
agriculture production systems.
Agricultural frontiers emerge after the improvement of trunk highways ensure 
year-round access and secondary roads are extended into surrounding forest. 
The rate of deforestation increases; forest remnants are progressively fragment-
ed and isolated. Timber exploitation remains important, but agriculture increases 
in area and technological sophistication. 
Consolidated frontiers are landscapes where pastures, fields, or plantations 
exceed forest cover; absolute rates of deforestation fall, but relative rates remain 
high as landholders clear forest remnants. Private sector investment in industri-
al infrastructure adds value to agricultural production, while the state improves 
basic infrastructure in urban centers. 
Gold rush frontiers are similar to forest frontiers, but deforestation is caused by 
illegal gold miners who transform and destroy floodplain habitats. Access may be 
by road, river or light plane.
Coca frontiers are agricultural frontiers populated by settlers who clear small 
patches in the forest to cultivate coca leaf for illicit drug markets. 
Table 1 .2: Original forest cover and deforestation in the Amazonian jurisdictions25














(% of Total 
Deforestation)
Bolivia 483,550 67,125 13.9 14,612 21.8
Brazil 4,243,362 670,861 15.8 50,035 7.5
Colombia 419,450 25,585 6.1 5,931 23.2
Ecuador 123,330 11,025 8.9 742 6.7
F. Guiana 75,000 650 0.9 360 55.4
Guyana 151,690 6,891 0.6 653 9.5
Peru 725,110 72,624 10.0 10,779 14.8
Suriname 146,931 6,683 0.7 723 10.8
Venezuela 396,335 13,063 3.3 1,740 13.3
Total 6,764,758 874,507 12.8 85,575 9.8
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CC BY 4.0.
Figure 1.2: The human-modified landscapes of the Pan Amazon can be stratified ac-
cording to geographic regions (a) and level of economic development (b) .
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landscape mosaics that include an approximately equivalent area of frag-
mented forest, both of which are surrounded by extensive areas of degraded 
forest damaged by illegal logging, wildfire, and overhunting. A conserva-
tive estimate of the total area of all these ‘human-modified landscapes’ is 
approximately 250 million hectares, which represents about thirty per cent 
of the geographic area of the Pan Amazon (Figure 1.2). 
The human-modified landscapes of the Amazon can be stratified 
into four macro-regions, based on biophysical and cultural attributes that 
have determined their recent development. Each landscape has a unique 
development trajectory, but there are identifiable stages that reflect levels 
of infrastructure investment, agricultural production system, levels of 
technology, and social capital (see Text Box 1.1 and Figure 1.3).
Amazon River corridor 
The upland terraces that flank the main stem of the Amazon River* are the 
oldest human-modified landscapes in the Pan Amazon. People have occu-
pied these lands for millennia,† but their ethnic composition has changed 
over time as immigrants and escaped slaves intermarried with indigenous 
people to forge unique cultural groups referred to as cabloco (Brazil) or 
ribereños (Peru) (Chapter 6). The river connects rural communities with 
about two dozen small towns and six major urban centres: Belem, Macapá, 
Santarem, Manaus, Tabatinga, Leticia (Colombia), and Iquitos (Peru). The 
most densely populated stretch of the river is located between the top of 
the delta and Manaus, but isolated communities extend upstream to the 
junction of the Ucayali and Marañon rivers in Eastern Peru. 
The foundation of the rural economy is based on the wild fish catch 
and non-timber forest products, particularly the super-fruit açaí, a palm 
that dominates floodplain habitats of the lower Amazon (Chapter 8). Most 
families cultivate a garden plot as part of their subsistence economy, while 
a limited number of secondary roads provide access to forest resources 
beyond the immediate confines of the river corridor. As a waterway, the 
river functions as a bulk transport system for bauxite mines located on 
upland landscapes adjacent to the floodplain (Chapter 5), as well as for 
commodities trans-shipped at ports that service the agricultural industry 
of the Southern Amazon (Chapter 2). Fluvial transport also serves the oil 
and gas sector while providing cost-effective transport for timber harvested 
* Brazilians divide the Amazon into two sections: The name ‘Amazon’ is used 
for the section below the junction of the Solimoes and Rio Negro at Manaus; 
upstream they refer to the river as the ‘Solimões’, which extends to the junction 
of the Marañon and Ucayali rivers in Peru. Peruvians refer to the Solimões as 
the Río Amazonas.
† There is abundant archaeological evidence in the form of black earth soils docu-
menting the extent of Pre-Colombian societies (Ch. 6).
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from remote regions accessed by dozens of tributaries. Manaus is a travel 
destination marketed as the gateway to the Amazon, while Leticia and 
Iquitos have developed nature and cultural tourism linked to the domestic 
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Figure 1.3: The human-modified landscapes of the Pan Amazon have different deforest-
ation histories depending upon the phase of their development . 
Source of land-use change data: Global Land Analysis and Discovery (GLAD).
14
The State of the Amazon
The natural habitats of the Amazon River Corridor are remarkably 
well conserved, particularly above Manaus, where a wilderness riverscape 
extends more than 2,000 kilometres. Near Manaus, both sides of the river 
have evolved into forest frontiers, while the upland landscape between 
Oriximiná and Prainha in northern Pará has been deforested by the small 
farms and ranches established in the late 1960s and 1970s (Figure 1.2). Across 
the river in Santarem, grain silos and port facilities at the terminus of BR-
163 are driving the conversion of pasture into cropland, which has caused 
this landscape in the heart of the Amazon to transition into an agricultural 
frontier dominated by the cultivation of soy. 
Southern Amazon
The national development strategies epitomised by a highway network 
carved out of forest wilderness in the 1970s and 1980s set in motion a 
development trajectory that caused this region to be known as the Arc of 
Deforestation (Chapters 2 and 6). More than seventy million hectares of 
tropical forests have been sacrificed to create an agricultural economy that 
stretches from Eastern Pará, Brazil to Santa Cruz, Bolivia. 
Low rates of deforestation within forest frontiers are a function of 
their remoteness and the poor state of their transportation infrastructure; 
landscapes closer to markets have transitioned into agricultural or consol-
idated frontiers. Rapid development has occurred on landscapes deemed 
to be geopolitically important (Rondônia) or where the soils were particu-
larly apt for field crops (Mato Grosso and Santa Cruz). Public lands have 
been distributed to more than a million pioneer families and several thou-
sand private companies via a variety of legal and extra-legal mechanisms 
(Chapter 6). The resulting land tenure mosaic reflects both the diversity of 
landholdings (small, medium, large, and massive), as well as the ongoing 
appropriation of state lands that continues to drive deforestation on forest 
frontiers (Chapter 4). 
Most smallholders dedicate a portion of their land to produce basic 
foodstuffs, but the production of beef cattle is the major driver of deforest-
ation on both forest and agricultural frontiers (Chapter 3). The global 
demand for soy in the 1990s stimulated the expansion of agribusiness and 
enabled business models dependent upon overseas export markets. The 
cultivation of maize in rotation with soy catalysed the explosive growth 
of the poultry and swine sectors, while the cultivation of oil palm diversi-
fied the rural economy in Northeast Pará (Chapter 3). Global competition 
is driving investment in bulk transport systems that link the production 
landscapes of the Southern Amazon to the grain terminals on the Amazon 
River (Chapter 2). 
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The cultivation of field crops is the preferred production strategy where topography 
and soils permit allow farmers to harvest two crops per year . The soy-maize production 
model contributed $US 25 billion to the Mato Grosso economy in 2020 . Corporate 
farms predominate on some landscapes (a), but they share the export market with 
thousands of family farms . All rely on logistical infrastructure, such as these silos on 
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The development strategies of the 1970s included programmes for 
the exploitation of the region’s mineral resources. Its recent history has 
been marked by chaotic gold rushes that ebb and flow with the price of 
gold (Chapter 5). More long-lasting development has resulted from the ex-
ploitation of world-class deposits of industrial metals at the Serra de Carajás 
in Pará, which stimulated investments in railroads, industrial mills and 
hydropower facilities. Infrastructure development represents a significant 
part of the regional economy, in part because the Brazilian government has 
built more than fifty hydropower facilities in the region, including several 
mega-scale facilities (> 1,000 MW) on the Madeira, Tocantins and Xingu 
rivers (Chapter 2). 
The Southern Amazon can be stratified into five forest frontiers, eight 
agricultural frontiers, five consolidated frontiers and one active gold-rush 
frontier (Figure 1.3). If current trends continue, the forest frontiers will 
transition into agricultural frontiers and agricultural frontiers into consol-
idated frontiers. These human-modified landscapes, which are organized 
around a network of trunk highways, are separated by forest remnants that 
are increasingly isolated from each other and from the continuous forest 
landscapes of the West, Central, and Northern Amazon.
Andean Amazon
The cultural traditions and the national development strategies pursued 
by the Andean republics created human-modified landscapes that are 
fundamentally different from the Southern Amazon. Each country built a 
series of individual highways that connect a specific sector of the Andean 
highlands with an adjacent region of the Amazon lowlands. All roads trav-
erse the Andean foothills, where tens of thousands of settlers established 
homesteads on steep slopes inappropriate for agriculture (Chapter 2). Soil 
erosion limits the productive capacity of farmsteads while threatening the 
integrity of the roads built on landscapes with extraordinarily high levels 
of rainfall. 
Colonisation has been driven by migration from indigenous highland 
communities who have laid claim to small landholdings using forest-fal-
low production systems to produce basic foodstuffs for domestic markets 
(Chapter 6). Over time, settlers have diversified their production systems to 
include oil palm, coffee and cacao, some of which is destined for overseas 
markets. Pastures are abundant, and many families own cattle; however, 
the beef industry is not a driver of deforestation but an artefact of the for-
est-fallow production system. On selected landscapes, farmers cultivate 
coca leaf, sometimes legally for domestic consumption but more often as an 
illicit crop for the global cocaine market. A limited number of corporations 
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have invested in large-scale oil palm plantations and associated industrial 
facilities in Peru and Ecuador (Chapter 3). 
The mineral wealth of the region is concentrated in the High Andes, 
where global corporations operate industrial mines in polymetallic ore bod-
ies that have been exploited for centuries. Gold that originated from these 
geological formations has been transported to the alluvial sediments on the 
piedmont that are exploited by small-scale miners in selected landscapes 
experiencing a gold rush. The Western Amazon has significant oil and gas 
reserves located beneath the alluvial landscapes east of the Andes, and 
the revenues derived from their exploitation have been a pillar of national 
economies and state budgets since the 1960s (Chapter 5). 
Investment in infrastructure has accelerated in the last two decades 
thanks to an international effort to coordinate national development strat-
egies and promote economic integration among countries via the Initiative 
for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA). 
Among the highest IIRSA priorities have been transportation corridors that 
transect wilderness landscapes, linking the Pacific Coast with the Amazon 
River and the agricultural landscapes of the Southern Amazon. The mas-
sive elevational drop in rivers that originate in the Andes has favoured the 
development of dozens of medium- and large-scale hydropower facilities. 
With one notable exception, efforts to promote mega-dams have not been 
successful because the proposed investments have not withstood financial 
due diligence (Chapter 2). 
The human-modified landscapes of the Andean Amazon include 
four forest frontiers and six agricultural frontiers, seven coca frontiers and 
© Christian Vinces/shutterstock.com.
Deforestation in the Andean foothills is particularly damaging due to high rainfall and 
soil erosion on steep slopes that limits the productive life span of cleared fields; settlers 
tend to be small farmers producing basic foodstuffs for the domestic market.
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two gold-rush frontiers (Figure 1.3). Migration and forest loss occur altitu-
dinally, as agricultural frontiers expand upslope, and laterally, as pioneers 
settle adjacent valleys or emerge onto nearby lowland landscapes. Unlike 
the Southern Amazon, where forest frontiers are associated with roads, 
the most dynamic forest frontiers in the Andes occur along river corridors 
(Chapter 6). Individual lowland landscapes have remained isolated from 
each other for decades; only Ecuador has built a road that connects all of the 
lowland settlement zones with an integrated trunk highway. The decision 
(or delay in deciding) to integrate settlement zones along the piedmont 
has maintained a limited number of biological corridors that connect the 
lowland forests of the Western Amazon and the montane forests of the 
Andean foothills (Figure 1.2a). 
Guianan Amazon
The human-modified landscapes of the Guiana Shield have avoided 
the settlement and colonisation phenomena that caused the widespread 
deforestation in the Southern Amazon and Andean Amazon. Historical 
settlements are clustered along the coast of Guyana, Suriname and French 
Guiana, while Venezuela has pursued a national development strategy 
based on petroleum development and urbanisation (Chapter 6). Only the 
Brazilian state of Roraima was the target of resettlement schemes in the 
1970s when a paved highway was built to connect Manaus with Boa Vista 
and, eventually, with the Venezuelan and Guyana national road networks. 
Currently, Brazil is building a modern highway in Amapá to connect the 
Amazon port city of Macapá with the development corridor of the Guiana 
Coast (Chapter 2). 
Suriname and Guyana were once major producers of bauxite, but 
those mines have shut down after exhausting the easily exploitable depos-
its, leaving behind degraded landscapes and toxic tailing ponds. Northern 
Pará and Amapá have significant reserves of ferrous minerals, copper and 
gold, but most are located within a strategic mineral reserve that is closed 
temporarily to exploitation (Chapter 5). Venezuela has economically attrac-
tive bauxite deposits and world-class reserves of iron ore; nonetheless, its 
industrial mines and processing facilities are operating at minimal levels 
due to economic mismanagement. 
The very considerable gold resources of the Guianan Amazon are 
associated with a geological formation known as a greenstone belt that 
has sustained a decades-long gold rush by small-scale miners, including 
native-born maroons  and temporary migrants from Brazil. Most of the 
deforestation in the Guianan Amazon is caused by these miners; conse-
quently, it is dispersed across landscapes as small patches that are difficult 
to detect using commonly available satellite images. Periodic gold rushes 
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have occurred in Bolivar state in Venezuela and along the border with the 
Brazilian state of Roraima. Large-scale corporate gold mines are operating 
or under development in Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana, and Amapá 
(Chapter 5). 
The human-modified landscapes of the Guiana Shield include two 
gold-rush frontiers, two forest frontiers and two consolidated frontiers. The 
recent discovery of large reserves of oil and gas offshore from Guyana and 
Suriname will transform their economies over the short term. 
Hydrological degradation
The Amazon River system is the world’s largest freshwater ecosystem, with 
nearly twenty per cent of the Earth’s freshwater discharge. It is a megad-
iverse aquatic biome and an enormously productive ecosystem that provides 
livelihoods and essential protein resources for its resident populations. It 
is also a strategic economic asset due to its hydropower capacity and as a 
waterway in a region that lacks roads (Chapter 2). The massive volume of 
water that flows through the Amazon River system provides an inherent 
level of resiliency, which is augmented by intact floodplain habitats that 
buffer seasonal fluctuations in waterflow and absorb the effluents of human 
society. Nonetheless, development phenomena have impacted the rivers 
and streams within human-modified landscapes. 
Illegal gold mining has impacted the biogeochemistry of the rivers that 
drain the gold-rush landscapes where small-scale gold miners are active 
(Figure 1.2b). The spatial footprint from individual mining operations is 
[relatively] small, but the environmental impact is magnified by the tendency 
of miners to operate within floodplains. The widespread use of mercury, a 
heavy metal with well-documented deleterious effects on human health, 
is creating an environmental legacy that will plague the region for decades 
(Chapter 5). Virtually all small-scale miners violate environmental laws and 
evade taxes; many are guilty of human rights violations (Chapter 7). Illegal 
gold mining is likely to increase over the near term due to the volatility of 
financial markets, which motivates global investors to buy gold as a hedge 
against uncertainty. 
Dams and reservoirs cause permanent and long-term impacts by 
modifying hydraulic regimes, capturing sediment, and interrupting fish 
migration (Figure 1.4). Multilateral financial agencies have provided key 
financing to both public and private entities; companies from China have 
acquired distressed hydropower assets in Peru and Brazil while providing 
turn-key solutions to Bolivia and Ecuador. All the Pan Amazon nations 
have pursued hydropower development as part of their national energy 
strategies, and Brazil is leveraging the construction of hydropower projects 
to develop waterways as bulk transport systems. 
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Land-use change and agricultural runoff have impacted the geochemistry 
of most of the headwaters of the rivers of the Southern Amazon, where 
the conversion of ~50% of the original forest cover has increased sediment 
loads and altered the nutrient status of the region’s unique ‘clear-water’ 
rivers. These impacts should be mitigated by environmental regulations 
that obligate landholders to conserve forest in riparian corridors; however, 
noncompliance is widespread, and efforts to motivate landholders to 
reforest riparian corridors are constrained by cost and apathy (Chapter 7). 
Deforestation has impacted precipitation regimes, which will decrease runoff 
volumes, a phenomenon that will become greater over time as farmers adopt 
irrigation technology to mitigate the threat of seasonal drought (Chapter 4). 
CC BY 4.0
Figure 1 .4: There are three major sources of hydrological degradation: (1) dams that trap 
sediments, interrupt hydraulic cycles and block fish migration (blue box); (2) illegal 
gold mines that destroy floodplains and release mercury (black x); and (3) run-off from 
land-use change (red areas) . The coloured polygons are ‘hydrosheds’, which stratify 
river basins based on biogeochemical attributes .26 
Sources: gold mine landscapes – Google Earth & RAISG (Rede Amazônica de Informação 
Socioambiental Georreferenciada); dams – RAISG; Hydrosheds – B. Lehner and G. Grill. 
2013. Hydrological Processes 27 (15): 2171–2186; Land cover data – ESA. Land Cover CCI 
Product User Guide Version 2. Tech. Rep. 2017.
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The Political Economy of the Pan Amazon 
Politics is idiosyncratic to each country, but trends in economic policies span 
borders. The political economy of the Pan Amazon is the legacy of strategic 
development plans that began in the mid decades of the twentieth century 
when the Amazonian nations turned their attention to the development of 
the Amazon (Chapter 6). 
The nationalist period (1960–1985) was characterised by authoritarian 
governments that sought to use the power of the state to harness the nat-
ural resources of the Amazon. The push into the region was seen as a way 
to generate economic growth, mitigate poverty and avoid political unrest 
driven by socialist ideology. Governments were insensitive to environmental 
and cultural impacts and viewed the Amazon as an unpopulated region 
that could absorb a growing population. Highways were extended into 
the wilderness, and public lands were distributed to landless peasants and 
corporate investors. Mining ventures and oil exploitation were subsidised 
by the state. Development was synonymous with deforestation. 
The neoliberal period (1985–2005) began with a wave of market-ori-
ented reforms designed to foster economic growth via the private sector. 
Referred to as the ‘Washington Consensus’, each country enacted a suite 
of policies to privatise state-owned entities, eliminate budget deficits, rein-
force property rights, promote free trade and facilitate foreign investment. 
The state’s role was to provide essential services, such as law enforcement 
and the administration of a streamlined regulatory apparatus. The Ama-
zon was integrated into an increasingly globalised economy; meanwhile, 
environmental and social advocates drew attention to the magnitude of 
deforestation and the plight of indigenous communities. The concept of 
sustainable development emerged from academia and soon dominated 
policy forums. Commodity exports were synonymous with development.
The populist period (2005–2019) was a reaction to the austerity asso-
ciated with neoliberal policies and a cultural aversion to foreign influence. 
Governments enjoyed robust electoral majorities by promising to address 
social inequality while embracing a form of democratic socialism that 
enhanced the role of the state in the national economy. Unlike previous 
socialist movements, however, these governments protected private sector 
actors who were generating the economic growth and export revenues 
essential for financing their political agendas.* Like their neoliberal pre-
cursors, populist governments made public commitments to sustainability, 
supported conservation initiatives and acted to protect the rights of indig-
enous communities, all while investing in infrastructure and conventional 
development paradigms. Sustainability was a synonym for the status quo.
* An exception to this was the government of Venezuela, which has pursued an 
extreme form of socialism combined with authoritarian rule.
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Each of these phases created ‘facts on the ground’ that would constrain 
or enhance development and conservation options in subsequent decades. 
For example, the trunk roads carved out of the forest between 1970 and 1980 
created the framework for future highway investments that are a recurrent 
feature in the annual budget of the Brazilian state. The development of oil and 
gas fields in the Andean republics during the 1960s now generates revenue 
streams essential for macroeconomic stability while creating infrastructure 
assets, such as pipelines, that are used to expand operations into wilderness 
landscapes (Chapter 5). The export-driven agribusiness production model 
consolidated during the late 1990s is now an indispensable component of 
the national economy and has endowed agribusiness with the financial 
capacity to invest in bulk transport systems (Chapter 2). The beef industry 
in Brazil and Bolivia has tens of thousands of constituents with sufficient 
political power to allow them to ignore land-use regulations intended to 
slow deforestation (Chapter 7). The creation of protected areas and the rec-
ognition of the territorial rights of indigenous people removed almost fifty 
per cent of the surface area of the Amazon from the reach of conventional 
development (Chapter 10). 
The political nature of the next period is uncertain. In 2019, Jair Bolson-
aro was elected president of Brazil with an avowed agenda of reversing the 
conservation policies of the past two decades and returning to the unbridled 
development that characterised the 1970s. In the Andean republics, there is 
widespread dissatisfaction with political elites tainted by corruption, but 
newly elected governments continue to pursue conventional development 
models, tolerating deforestation and the destruction of aquatic ecosystems 
caused by small-scale gold miners. Venezuela is a basket case, while the 
republics of the Guyana Coast are in the process of embracing an economy 
reliant on fossil fuels. 
Understanding the conventional economy 
The economies of nations are traditionally evaluated by their gross domes-
tic product (GDP), a metric that measures the total economic output of a 
nation. The GDP of the Pan Amazon was approximately $US 270 billion in 
2017 (Figure 1.5),* a modest number in a global economy valued at $US 80 
trillion in the same year. By way of comparison, this is approximately equal 
to the total income of the online retail company that has appropriated the 
* This value was compiled from reports published by national statistical agencies 
that stratify information by sub-national jurisdiction and sub-sector; Guyana 
and Suriname report only national data; Venezuela does not report GDP data 
stratified by region and is excluded. The GDP metric reported here is based on 
‘current value’ and compared among jurisdictions using mean annual exchange 
rates in 2017.
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Figure 1.5: The GDP of the Pan Amazon stratified by political jurisdiction and sector 
(a) and subsector (b) . Agriculture & Forestry: Agriculture (AG), Fisheries & Aquacul-
ture (FI), Forestry (FO), Livestock (LI); Industry: Extractives (EX), Manufacturing 
(MA), Construction (CN); Services (Private Sector): Real Estate (RE), Commerce 
(CO), Transportation (TR), Hospitality (HO), Telecommunications (TE), Finance 
(FI), Professional Services (PS), Other services (OS); Services (Public Sector): Public 
Administration (PA), Utilities (UT); Illicit Activities: Coca/Cocaine (CC), Artisanal 
Gold (Au) .27
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name of the world’s largest tropical forest.* The contribution to national 
GDP from the jurisdictions located within the Pan Amazon range from a 
high of 100% (Guyana and Suriname) to a low of 0.2% (French Guiana). The 
contribution of Amazonian regions to national GDP is small but significant 
in Brazil (8%), Peru (13%) and Ecuador (10%), less in Colombia (2%), and 
considerably more in Bolivia (59%), where three major urban centres lie 
within the Amazon basin.†
There are numerous problems with using GDP as an analytical 
metric (see below); nonetheless, it is the most commonly used statistic for 
evaluating the economy of a nation. The first priority of most governments 
is to promote economic growth, and their motivation is as simple as it is 
obvious: an increase in GDP reflects increased wealth, which can be used 
to reduce poverty; a decrease connotes a recession, which usually means 
an increase in poverty. Governments, and their advisors in multilateral 
development institutions, use GDP and its underlying metrics to identify 
how fiscal policies, such as taxes, subsidies and public investment impact 
the conventional economy. GDP is particularly informative when it is 
disaggregated into component metrics that measure economic production 
for economic [sub] sectors and organised by subnational jurisdiction (see 
Annexes 1.1 and 1.2). 
The GDP metric has limited utility when evaluating the economic 
health of a society.7  Its detractors point out five major limitations, all of which 
are germane to the Amazon: (1) it provides no information on inequality; 
(2) it underestimates the contribution of the informal sector;‡ (3) it makes 
no attempt to measure the economic value of subsistence activities; (4) it 
does not distinguish between sustainable activities, such as the harvest of 
renewable resources, and non-sustainable business models, such as the 
exploitation of non-renewable resources; (5) it fails to account for negative 
outcomes that create a long-term economic liability, such as an oil spill§ or 
the loss of a key ecosystem service. In spite of these limitations, or because 
they are so obvious, a review of the conventional economy using GDP 
metrics highlights the challenges and opportunities facing the pursuit of 
a sustainable economy. 
* Amazon.com reported $US 233 billion in total sales in 2018 with an annual 
growth rate of ~30%; in contrast, GDP for the Pan Amazon increased by about 
2% between 2017 and 2018.
† Santa Cruz, La Paz and Cochabamba together comprise about 55% of the popu-
lation.
‡ When lacking data, economists estimate metrics using models based on (i) dif-
ferences in expenditures and income or (ii) currency demand, or (iii) by tracking 
the consumption of a commodity correlated with economic activity such as 
electricity; source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
§ Ironically, expenditures to remediate an oil spill will register as a positive contri-
bution to GDP. 
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Perhaps the most revealing number in the sectoral GDP statistics is 
the minuscule contribution of the forest sector (< 2%), a paltry sum when 
considering the intrinsic value* of the Amazon’s vast renewable natural 
resources (Figure 1.5). The most obvious explanation for this low number is 
the failure to assign value to subsistence activities. Indigenous people and 
traditional communities harvest food and fibre from natural ecosystems; 
most forest families grow food for their own consumption. These activities 
have tangible economic value and are central to the livelihoods of forest 
families, but they are ignored by measurements of GDP. Additionally, 
most households complement subsistence activities by harvesting timber, 
non-timber forest products and wildlife. Some of this production is captured 
by the statistics, particularly for the commercialisation of forest goods with 
strong export markets, such as Brazil nuts and palm fruits; however, other 
valuable products, such as timber and fish, are sold to middlemen who 
operate within the informal sector of the domestic economy (Chapter 8). 
Nonetheless, if the real contribution of the forest economy was twice the 
value of the official statistics, it would still lag the sectors of the economy 
driving deforestation and other forms of environmental degradation. The 
low valuation of forest products shines a spotlight on the challenge of us-
ing the forest economy as an alternative development strategy to displace 
agriculture and livestock. 
The informal economy in Latin American nations accounts for ap-
proximately thirty per cent of total economic activity;8 that proportion is 
greater in frontier communities, where ‘cash is king’ and the institutions 
of the state are weak or absent. This is even more true for smallholder 
landscapes where subsistence farming is combined with the cultivation of 
foodstuffs commercialised in domestic markets (Chapter 3). Approximately 
ten per cent of the previously deforested lands in Brazil and Bolivia have 
been settled by small farmers; although their spatial footprint is limited, 
they constitute about seventy per cent of rural families and are an impor-
tant source of basic foodstuffs, such as manioc, rice, beans and a variety 
of tropical fruits.9 
In Peru and Ecuador, the predominance of smallholders is much 
greater, representing about 98 per cent of all landholdings and occupying 
more than ninety per cent of agricultural landscapes (Chapter 4). The 
production model pursued by the majority of smallholders on frontier 
* Investors use the term intrinsic value to describe the potential value of an asset 
based on an objective evaluation that considers the long-term potential return; 
it is used in juxtaposition to the term market value, which reflects the earnings 
generated by the asset. Philosophers and environmental economists use intrin-
sic value to describe a point of view that resists efforts to ascribe a monetary 
value to nature, arguing that it has value in and of itself. Both usages are valid 
for the Amazon.
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landscape is based on slash-and-burn technology, which is used to establish 
and maintain a forest-fallow production system. Most farmers invest in 
perennial production systems over time as they diversify their crops and 
plantations, but they expand cultivation at the expense of remnant forests 
within their properties. The full value of their production is not incorpo-
rated into GDP, which causes the official statistics to underestimate their 
contribution to the regional economy, as well as the economic forces that 
drive deforestation by smallholders. 
A more significant factor in the underappreciation of agriculture and 
livestock production is the methodological framework designed to avoid 
double accounting when compiling the GDP metric. Unlike the underre-
porting caused by the informal economy or subsistence farmers, this is 
not a bug (flaw) but a feature of the GDP bookkeeping methodology. The 
value of the production for any sector is measured only once, and in the 
case of agriculture, that data is captured at the ‘farmgate’ a term used to 
describe the price paid to the producer. All subsequent transactions ‘add 
value’ to the commodity and are accrued to a supply chain participant; for 
© Dr. Morley Read /shutterstock.com.
Coffee cultivation can be a driver of deforestation when new fields are established by 
clearing natural forest, or a sustainable form of tropical agriculture if producers expand 
by recovering abandoned fields and secondary forest. Photograph from Ecuador.
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example, the increased value of dressed beef and soy oil are accrued to the 
manufacturing sector, while the cost of hauling grains to export terminals 
is allocated to the transportation sector. Similarly, expenditures for inputs 
made by farmers and ranchers prior to the harvest or the sale of livestock 
are subtracted from farmgate revenues and assigned to their respective 
service sectors, which includes veterinarians, seed companies, appliance 
dealers, fuel companies, and agrochemical venders. A comparison of the 
total gross value of farm production in Mato Grosso compared to the val-
ue-added metric used to compile sectoral GDP reveals that 45 per cent of 
the total proceeds are allocated to service providers or manufacturers in 
the commodity supply chain.10 
The service sector is the largest component of GDP in seven juris-
dictions and the second most important sector in the remaining ten (see 
Annexes 1.1 and 1.2). The predominance of the service sector is not un-
common among nations because it is a basket of many different economic 
activities. The growth of the service sector is also the consequence of the 
ongoing urbanisation of Amazonian society (Chapter 6). More than fifty 
per cent of the region’s inhabitants reside in cities with populations greater 
than 100,000, and the overwhelming majority work in the service sector. 
Many of the services in large cities are environmentally benign and could 
be easily accommodated within a ‘green’ economy, including telecommu-
nications, information management, health care, hospitality, and finance. 
Only Manaus has a strong manufacturing sector, an anomalous situation 
maintained by subsidies and tariff barriers. The other large cities (Belem, 
Santa Cruz, Cuiabá, Santarem, Porto Velho) are economically diverse, but 
their manufacturing and service companies rely directly or indirectly on 
revenues from the extractive industry or the agricultural and livestock 
sectors. The dependence of mid-sized cities (10,000 to 100,000 residents) on 
the rural economy is even more pronounced because they are the economic 
gateway for private sector services to farms, ranches and rural communities. 
Mid-size cities and towns are also where rural inhabitants access 
public services, most importantly health care and secondary education, 
but also technical assistance and financial credit. The poor quality of rural 
schools motivates many families to maintain a residence in nearby small 
towns, one of several factors contributing to rural-urban migration. Urban 
inhabitants also enjoy access to basic services taken for granted in advanced 
economies, including sanitation, electricity, access to the internet and higher 
education. All of these are absent in the rural Amazon. Government ex-
penditures are relatively large in Brazil and are the leading sector in Acre, 
Amapá, Rondônia and Roraima (see Annex 1.2), which reflects that nation’s 
willingness to subsidise its frontier jurisdictions via revenue transfers from 
federal to state and local budgets. This includes operating budgets for law 
enforcement and agricultural research and extension, as well as support 
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for a large public university system (Chapter 9), environmental oversight 
(Chapter 7) and management of protected areas (Chapter 11). 
Brazil’s generosity contrasts with the nations of the Andes, where 
small public budgets in Amazonian jurisdictions are a legacy of their cen-
tralised governance systems (Chapter 7). The somewhat greater contribution 
in Bolivia is due to the inclusion of its capital city (La Paz) within the Pan 
Amazon, while Colombia’s is the consequence of the budget allocated to 
its security forces (Chapter 6 and 7). Guyana and Suriname have budgets 
that were historically similar to the Andean republics, but public expendi-
tures will surge after 2021, when offshore oil fields start producing oil and 
natural gas (Chapter 5). 
Public budgets provide one of the easiest avenues for channeling 
financial resources to shift the Amazonian economy away from non-sus-
tainable production paradigms, which is why the jurisdictional approach 
is gaining popularity as a way to organise the payment-for-ecosystem ser-
vices.* The challenge will be to translate an increase in state expenditures 
into a modification of behaviour by private sector actors. Brazil pursued 
a version of this strategy from 2004 to 2018 when it successfully reduced 
deforestation within its Amazonian states by eighty per cent (Chapter 10); 
however, this effort has caused a political backlash by landowners opposed 
to the regulatory measures imposed by the state.
All the Pan Amazonian nations suffer from a deficit in basic infra-
structure, a consequence of decades of underinvestment caused by political 
instability, poor governance and financial austerity imposed by multilateral 
financial institutions.11 A surge in construction activity occurred between 
2005 and 2015 when the global commodity boom provided national govern-
ments with revenues that allowed them to radically increase investments in 
basic infrastructure (Chapter 2). Urban areas benefited most because that 
was where the need was greatest; however, investments in transportation 
networks and energy systems were a priority as governments sought to 
increase economic growth by integrating frontier landscapes into the national 
economy and harnessing the natural resources of the Amazon. 
The contribution of the construction industry to regional GDP is large 
across all jurisdictions, placing just behind agriculture as a component of 
the conventional economy (see Figure 1.6). Financing for infrastructure 
comes from a combination of annual budgets, debt issued from national 
development banks, government-backed bonds and multilateral develop-
ment agencies. State-backed entities from China have become a prominent 
participant in large-scale hydropower projects, while private investors 
have assumed a leading role in the development of railroads (Chapter 2). 
* See the section below, ‘Monetising the Value of Ecosystem Services – or Not’ on 
page 55. 
29
The Political Economy of the Pan Amazon 
Large-scale construction projects in Amazonian jurisdictions have been 
harshly criticised for their environmental and social impacts (Chapter 7); 
nonetheless, they enjoy the support of elected officials from successive gov-
ernments. The construction sector is an unabashed proponent of investment 
in transportation and energy infrastructure and views deforestation and 
hydrological degradation as acceptable environmental impacts.
There is an inherent synergy between expenditures in construction 
and the value of real estate. Investments add value to an asset, while prop-
erty values increase following improvements in public infrastructure. The 
reported contribution of real estate transactions to GDP is approximately 
the same as that of construction and, likewise, is largely the consequence of 
investments in urban centres. The declared value of real estate transactions, 
however, is often under-reported by buyers and sellers in order to evade 
taxes, a practice more prevalent on frontier landscapes where contracts 
are executed without the intermediation of banks (Chapter 4).* This com-
mon practice is another example of how the informal economy gives rise 
to corrupt practices, and its contribution to GDP is underestimated. Real 
estate markets are further distorted by the highly lucrative activity of land 
grabbing and, in the Andean republics, money laundering linked to illicit 
drugs (Chapter 3). Reining in land grabbing is impeded by the agencies 
that administer titles, which are plagued by administrative inefficiencies, a 
backlog of work spanning decades and functionaries complicit in criminal 
activity (Chapter 4).
The extractive industries in Pan Amazonian jurisdictions are mas-
sively important for the national economies of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Guyana, Suriname and, to a slightly lesser extent, Bolivia and the state of 
Pará (Annexes 1.1 and 1.2). All mineral resources in the Pan Amazon are 
the property of the state, which exploits them via a state-owned enterprise 
or some type of joint venture with corporations that specialise in mining or 
the production of hydrocarbons (Chapter 5). Revenues accrue to a region’s 
GDP, even though they do not flow through the local economy; instead, 
they are deposited directly into the national treasury. This bookkeeping 
procedure distorts the value of the GDP-per-capita, which is often [mis-]
reported by the mass media as a measure of human wellbeing. Forty-five 
per cent of GDP in Amazonian Ecuador is contributed by oil exports and, 
if you exclude that revenue from the regional GDP, the per capita value in 
2017 would fall from US$ 11,500 to US$ 6,400. 
Governments return mineral rents to producing regions as royalties 
that are included within GDP values reported for public administration. 
* In Bolivia, transactions are actually formalised with two sets of parallel docu-
ments: one with the real value, which is kept private, and one with a ‘cadastral’ 
value, which is reported to the authorities. In spite of an obvious fraud, courts 
will accept the real value version in litigation.
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Royalties vary among jurisdictions and across commodities: Peru has the 
most generous revenue sharing mechanism, which combines royalties with 
corporate income tax in a system referred to as a Canon. Brazil has the most 
frugal royalty system but transfers a larger sum of money via the general 
budgetary system (Chapter 5). Like agriculture, the extractive industries 
generate benefits to regions via the service sector, which vary depending 
upon the mineral commodity: hydrocarbons pay higher royalties but 
consume fewer services, while miners pay lower royalties but consume 
more services.* In Ecuador and Colombia, the exploitation of petroleum 
was a major driver of Amazonian settlement and deforestation, while the 
development of the iron ore deposits in the Carajás highlands was part of 
a multi-sectoral development strategy (see Text Box 1.2).12 
The mining sector has an illegal component that is one of the most 
lucrative activities in the Pan Amazon. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining 
generated an estimated seven billion dollars in 2017, of which about half 
was exported via channels invisible to authorities. Most small-scale miners 
use placer mining technologies that destroy floodplains while polluting 
watersheds with mercury. The most seriously impacted basins are the 
tributaries to Madeira (Madre de Dios and Beni) and Tapajós (Crepori), the 
Caroni River in Venezuela, the Essequibo in Guyana and the Courantyne 
on the border between Suriname and French Guiana (Chapter 5). 
* In Ecuador, value added GDP was 50% of the gross oil production, while in 
Pará, value added GDP was 40% of gross revenues. Since production costs are 
fixed, these percentages vary depending on the price of these global commod-
ities. Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE) and Dirección 
Nacional de Síntesis Macroeconómica, Banco Central de Ecuador.
© Dr. Morley Read /shutterstock.com.
The Trans Andean oil pipeline in Ecuador has caused numerous oil spills during its 
40-year life span; the right-of-way is used by locals to access small farms cleared from 
the forest . Petroleum production is an important source of government revenues . 
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Text Box 1.2: The Carajás – São Luis Development Corridor
Pará has developed a metallurgical industry, the result of a deliberate national 
strategy to add value to mineral exports; this has led to investment in industrial 
mills that transform bauxite into aluminum and iron ore into steel. Aluminum 
smelting is an energy-intensive process and that has motivated the construction 
of large-scale hydropower facilities on the Tocantins and Xingu Rivers. Steel 
mills and pig-iron foundries consume vast quantities of vegetable charcoal 
provided by landholders who established cattle ranches along the rail line 
between the mines at the Serra de Carajás and the port facilities near São Luis 
do Maranhão. 
State governments in Pará have a tradition of being ‘pro-mining’, which reflects 
the economic benefits derived from the mines, including royalties and tax rev-
enues, but more importantly from the economic growth spawned by the goods 
and services sold to the mining companies. The development corridor between 
the Serra de Carajás and São Luis do Maranhão has lost more than eighty per 
cent of its original forest cover. 
© Christian Inga/shutterstock.com.
Placer gold mines on a tributary to the Río Madre de Dios in Southern Peru; these strip-
mines are particularly pernicious because their impacts extend far beyond deforestation 
of the mine site, which typically spans the entire floodplain from river terrace to river 
terrace for dozens of kilometers .  Watersheds are polluted by mercury and sediments, 
while fish migration is impeded both above and below the mine site. This highly lu-
crative activity is pursued by small to medium-sized miners who operate outside law . 
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Another illegal activity not captured by GDP is the coca-cocaine sup-
ply chain that originates in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. The quasi-legal (or 
tolerated) cultivation of coca is associated with blatantly illegal laboratories 
that process coca leaf into cocaine. The coca-cocaine supply chain generates 
about 1.5 billion dollars annually within Amazonian jurisdictions, an amount 
multiplied several times over as money is laundered in the commerce, con-
struction and real estate sectors. Coca cultivation is an important source 
of deforestation in the Andean foothills, where it occurs on landscapes 
surrounding protected areas and indigenous territories (Chapters 3 and 10). 
The Natural History of the Amazon Rainforest 
In the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, scientists affiliated 
with institutions in the Northern Hemisphere organised most expeditions 
into the Amazon. These botanists, zoologists and anthropologists were 
accompanied by native-born and immigrant scientists who pioneered the 
establishment of natural history museums in the nations of the Pan Amazon. 
Investment in research and education expanded dramatically as govern-
ments pursued development strategies predicated on the exploitation of the 
region’s natural resources. Institutional capacity grew to encompass more 
than fifty universities and a half dozen research institutions within the Pan 
Amazon. Collections, publications and students grew exponentially and, 
by the end of the millennium, more specimens were accessioned annually 
in the regional museums than all of the legacy collections housed in foreign 
museums (Chapter 9). 
The collections in European and North American museums are the 
foundation of the taxonomic classification systems at the centre of biodiversity 
science; unfortunately, that information was unavailable to local biologists, 
who struggled to identify the plants and animals they encountered during 
their fieldwork. Starting in the 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s and 2000s, 
innovation in information management and the creation of the internet 
revolutionised biodiversity science. Online information resources, such as 
taxonomic databases and digital image archives, have vastly improved the 
quantity and quality of floristic and faunistic inventories. Every country 
can now boast a relatively complete catalogue of all vertebrate groups and 
a robust checklist of vascular plants, which continue to improve as cadres 
of young biologists explore their countries. Biogeographers and popula-
tion ecologists can now accurately map the distribution and abundance of 
species, which has improved the identification of endemic species unique 
to a specific region or locality, as well as objectively evaluate the risk of 
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extinction for individual species.* Regional biologists routinely participate 
in the global effort sponsored by the International Union for Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) to identify species at risk of extinction while leading the 
same effort within their own countries. Having these studies executed by 
native-born biologists laboring within domestic institutions has increased 
the legitimacy of that information in the eyes of government and society. 
Forest ecology and carbon dynamics
A tropical rain forest is composed of thousands of species of long-lived 
trees, each with a natural history characterised by unique morphological, 
physiological and reproductive attributes. Very little was known about the 
ecological processes within these plant communities in 1980 when ecologists 
began to establish long-term studies to document their composition, structure 
and function. In one project near Manaus, scientists created an experiment 
to evaluate the impact of deforestation and forest fragmentation on plant 
and animal communities.† In another, dozens (eventually, hundreds) of 
botanists affiliated with local universities and research institutions created 
a network‡ of hundreds (eventually, thousands) of permanent one-hectare 
plots scattered across the entire region. They have used these plots to study 
Amazonian tree biodiversity, identifying which species are extraordinarily 
abundant (hyperdominant) and which are exceedingly rare, as well as 
documenting how tree communities vary across latitudinal, elevational 
and climatic gradients, information essential for understanding how the 
Amazon might change in the future due to global warming (Chapter 9).
* Governments also invested in research in the applied sciences that contributed 
to the economic development of the region and, intentionally or otherwise, 
accelerated deforestation and environmental degradation. Among the most 
devastating consequences of this research and development was the evaluation 
and introduction of cultivated grasses of African origin combined with the 
genetic improvement of cattle breeds from South Asia. The Brazilian agricultur-
al research service (EMBRAPA) transformed tropical agriculture by developing 
varieties of soybeans adapted to the humid tropics (Chapter 3). Research by 
plant pathologists and entomologists in Colombia and Ecuador overcame inher-
ent limitations to plantation production systems to support the expansion of oil 
palm (Colombia) and cacao (Ecuador).   
† Ecologists affiliated with the Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia (INPA) 
in collaboration with the Smithsonian Institution initiated The Biological Dynam-
ics of Forest Fragments Project (BDFFP), a long-term experiment begun in 1979 to 
document how deforestation and fragmentation affect the composition, struc-
ture, and function of a forest ecosystem: 
‡ Red Amazónica de Inventarios Forestales (RAINFOR) has published more than 200 
peer-reviewed papers authored by 200 contributing authors; see: http://www.
rainfor.org/en 
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Because ecologists count trees and measure their dimensions, they 
have revealed the dimensions of the Amazon’s massive carbon reserves; 
more importantly, because they repeat their measurements periodically, 
they have discovered that the Amazon ecosystem has functioned as a net 
carbon sink over the last several decades. Surprisingly, they discovered 
that the photosynthetic capacity of intact primary forest was so great that 
wilderness landscapes have been sequestering more carbon on an annual 
basis than was being lost via deforestation and forest degradation on the 
forest frontier. Unfortunately, these same studies identified a trend of in-
creasing tree mortality and a shift in species composition that may cause 
intact primary forest to become a net source of carbon emissions over the 
next decade. The shift in ecosystem function is due, in part, to alterations in 
the physiological processes in leaves stressed by periodic drought and high 
temperatures but also to a shift in the composition of tree species caused 
by increased tree mortality (Chapter 9). 
Investments in forest ecology were matched by parallel efforts to 
observe and evaluate forest landscapes using remote sensing technology. 
Brazil led the way in the early 1980s with a commitment to annually quantify 
deforestation using satellite images, a decision that would have an enormous 
impact on the public debate about the expansion of the agricultural frontier 
(Chapters 2 and 9), as well as the decisions made in international forums 
dealing with climate change (Chapter 10). The protocols and technology 
developed by the Brazilian space agency have been adopted as a global 
standard and are now used by all the Pan Amazonian nations to monitor 
their own forest frontiers. Over time, innovation in remote sensing technology 
led to the deployment of satellite-borne sensors that could monitor defor-
estation in real time, as well as identify forest degradation from logging and 
wildfire (Figure 1.6). These studies complemented field research by forest 
ecologists, which allowed researchers to spatially map the distribution of 
forest biomass, as well as detect how seasonal and interannual variation 
in weather was impacting ecosystem function at the landscape, regional, 
and continental scales (Chapter 10). 
Climate change and moisture recycling
Starting in the 1990s, ecosystem ecologists and atmospheric scientists in 
the Brazilian space agency embarked on a sophisticated collaboration 
with NASA and other international research institutions; their goal was to 
understand and model the interactions between the atmosphere, the ocean 
and the forest ecosystem. They collected data using instruments mounted 
on satellites, airborne platforms and canopy towers, a collaboration that 
discovered how cyclical anomalies in ocean temperatures, such as El Niño/
La Niña, drive the decadal-scale droughts and floods that impact the Am-
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azon. Their most important finding was to elucidate how tropical forests 
recycle water between the surface and the upper troposphere via a process 
known as ‘deep convection’; sometimes referred to as a ‘biotic pump’; this 
natural system maintains the high precipitation that defines the Amazon 
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Figure 1.6: The 2020 fire season in the Amazon south of the Equator was typical: The 
burning season starts in July as landholders use fire to renovate pastureland (a) and 
clear fields on existing farms (b). The use of fire increases at the end of the dry season 
(September to October) when landholders burn recently deforested land to expand 
production (c). Managed fire escapes to create wildfire that impacts the understory of 
natural forest (d) . The y-axis shows the area (km2) burned as measured by the MODIS 
instrument on NASA satellites . 
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The impacts of deforestation, forest fragmentation and forest deg-
radation are all weakening water recycling, and this is enhancing the 
intensity and frequency of seasonal and interannual drought. The risk is 
particularly acute in the Southern Amazon, a climatic transition zone where 
subtle shifts in ecological succession can determine whether a landscape is 
dominated by forest or savanna species. When and if a forest community 
is established, feedback mechanisms will reinforce the biotic pump, which 
favours an equilibrium state that supports the maintenance of rainforest. A 
rapid transition to a non-forest equilibrium can occur if a key environmental 
factor, such as drought, wildfire or logging, passes a threshold that alters 
the microclimate that favours forest species. When that occurs, rain forest 
trees suffer high rates of mortality and are replaced by species adapted to 
open savanna-like conditions (Chapter 10). 
Climate models show that drought in the Amazon will become both 
more frequent and intense, while higher temperatures increase stress on 
tropical trees. There is increasing concern that the Southern Amazon could 
suffer from two or more consecutive years of drought, which could trigger 
a large-scale forest dieback of cataclysmic proportions. Known as the ‘tip-
ping point hypothesis’, it is a clarion call of the dangers from uncontrolled 
deforestation, illegal logging and the indiscriminate use of fire by small 
farmers and ranchers. The impact of a collapsing forest ecosystem would 
extend well beyond the loss of biodiversity in the remnant forests of the 
Southern Amazon because it would signal a dramatic reduction in rainfall 
across the region – and beyond.
The most economically significant discovery of recent years grew out 
of a collaboration between meteorological agencies to integrate the subre-
gional manifestations of the annual wet and dry seasons into a common 
continental-scale climate system. Christened the South American Monsoon 
(SAM), it mediates the flow of water from the Atlantic Ocean westward across 
the Amazon, south along the base of the Andes and, eventually, southeast 
into the subtropical landscapes of Bolivia, Paraguay, Central Brazil and 
Northern Argentina (Figure 1.7). The combination of the water recycling 
driven by deep convection within the Amazon and the distribution of wa-
ter across the continent by the SAM directly links the productivity of one 
of the planet’s most important bread baskets – and the economic health of 
four nations – with the conservation of the Amazon rain forest (Chapter 9). 
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Figure 1 .7: The South American Monsoon is established and controlled by the rotation 
of the Earth, the seasonal shift of the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), the height 
of the Andes, and atmospheric pressure gradients driven by temperature differences 
across the South American land mass . 
Data source: Marwan, N. and J. Kurths. 2015. ‘Complex network based techniques to 
identify extreme events and (sudden) transitions in spatio-temporal systems’. Chaos: 
An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science 25 (9): 097609.
38
The State of the Amazon
Environmental Policy and Action on the Ground
From the outset, academics realised that the development programmes being 
deployed across the Amazon in the 1960s and 1970s would bring irreversible 
harm. Attempts to promote conservation were a natural outgrowth of their 
efforts to document the region’s biodiversity and ecological complexity. They 
were not the first defenders of the Amazon, however; that distinction belongs 
to indigenous people who had been fighting to protect their way of life for 
centuries. These two groups, sometimes working together and sometimes 
independently, motivated citizens across the world to organise civil society 
groups, now known as ‘non-governmental organisations’ (NGOs), to advo-
cate for biodiversity conservation, the protection of indigenous rights and 
eventually the transformation of the region’s economy. Governments and 
the private sector have responded by implementing policies and adopting 
business practices that seek to staunch the deterioration of the environment. 
NASA (Public Domain)
Wildfires typically start when landholders burn pasture to renew forage or clear 
forest to establish new fields; managed fire often spreads into adjacent natural forest 
and, during drought years, can damage millions of hectares of primary forest habitat . 
This photograph of wildfires along the Río Xingu was taken by astronauts from the 
International Space Station in 2011 .
NASA Earth Observatory, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/71256/fires-
along-the-rio-xingu-brazil
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It remains to be seen, however, whether these actions will be sufficient to 
change human behaviour on frontier landscapes or slow global warming 
within the timeframe needed to save the Amazon. These policies are now 
being called into question by newly elected governments in Brazil and 
Bolivia that have embraced conventional development models, by chaos 
in Venezuela, and equivocation in Ecuador, Peru, Guyana and Suriname.
Environmental governance 
The Pan Amazon nations have constitutions that were reformed or rewrit-
ten in the last decades of the twentieth century. Previous versions either 
ignored nature or incorporated a simple clause assigning the state the ‘duty’ 
to protect [or improve] the environment. Brazil’s constitution of 1988 was 
radically different: ten separate articles address nature conservation or 
environmental management by declaring that access to a healthy environ-
ment is a basic human right. The reformed national charters of Colombia 
(1991), Peru (1993), Bolivia (1994, 2009), Venezuela (1999) and Ecuador 
(2008) all include mandates to enact environmental legislation and create 
environmental ministries.* Ecuador’s is the most emphatic, stating that 
Mother Nature (Pachamama) has rights that must be honoured by human 
society (Chapter 7). 
Environmental ministries are responsible for developing environmen-
tal policy and administering agencies that regulate the public and private 
use of natural resources. Most share management responsibilities, however, 
with other agencies that reflect competing domestic agendas. For example, 
the national forest service is part of the Ministry of Agriculture in Brazil 
and Peru, while the regulation of water resources is shared with agricul-
ture (Peru) or energy agencies (Brazil) or enshrined as a separate agency 
(Ecuador). Environmental ministries have well-defined responsibilities to 
oversee the management of the long-term environmental (brown) liabilities 
linked to the extractive sector (Chapter 5) and to review the potential harm 
from industrial development and infrastructure investments.
The stated goal of modern environmental management is to ‘avoid, 
mitigate or compensate’ the negative effects of modern development. The 
Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA) framework was introduced into Latin 
America in the 1990s, and EIAs are now routinely conducted as part of the 
due diligence and feasibility planning processes for major industrial or 
infrastructure investments. Like their counterparts in the advanced econ-
omies, these technical documents reflect the conflicting societal pressures 
between promoters of economic growth and advocates for nature conser-
vation. Their methodologies are far from perfect, but their utilisation has 
* The current constitutions of Guyana (1980) and Suriname (1987), adopted at 
their independence, have only a single clause dealing with the environment.
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vastly diminished harm when compared to the status quo ante . The IIRSA 
initiative has sought to harmonise the EIA processes across the continent, 
which has improved the technical capacity of environmental ministries and 
facilitated private sector investment in much needed public infrastructure 
(Chapter 2). 
Many environmental advocates view them as a greenwash, however, 
and there is ample objective evidence that the EIA service industry is bi-
ased toward the approval and completion of individual projects (Chapter 
7). There are few examples of projects that have been canceled due to the 
discoveries identified in an EIA; instead, developers use the evaluation 
process to identify and modify specific aspects while ensuring projects 
move forward to completion.*
PAC collection at flickr.com; CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
The dam and power plant at Jirau on the Río Madeira in Rondônia was built between 
2008 and 2016 as part of the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento – PAC (Growth 
Acceleration Program) over the objections of aquatic ecologists who advised it would 
alter natural flood cycles, impede the flow of sediments to downstream habitats and 
obstruct the migration of commercial catfish species essential to the livelihoods of 
thousands of river communities .
* The rare example of a cancelled project is the proposed dam at São Luis de 
Tapajós, which was canceled in 2017; in contrast, serial observations by both 
official and independent technical panels criticising the proposed dams on the 
Xingu River led to a reconfiguration of their components and the eventual con-
struction of the Belo Monte facility between 2000 and 2019 (Ch. 2 and 7).
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The limitations of the EIA system led to the development of a com-
plementary approach known as a Strategic Environmental Analysis (SEA) 
designed to identify alternative development options far out into the future. 
The SEA is viewed as a way to avoid environmental degradation because 
it is predicated on the participation of civil society and local communities 
that would foresee and veto non-sustainable development pathways. There 
have been three high-profile attempts to conduct an SEA along highway 
corridors sponsored by the IIRSA initiative.* In each case, they contributed to 
the creation of one or more protected areas, but none substantially changed 
the economic and social forces driving deforestation in the landscapes 
impacted by those highways (Chapter 7).
Another strategic planning methodology embraced by governments 
is land-use planning that combines information on soil, water and biodiver-
sity with social and economic data to make zoning recommendations for 
political jurisdictions. This approach was conceived in the 1970s to identify 
lands appropriate for agriculture but evolved into a more holistic system 
in the 1990s as governments reacted to the deforestation crisis. Referred to 
as Zonificación Ecológica Econômica (ZEE), these studies typically recognise 
the status quo of existing settlements and highways while discouraging 
development on fragile lands or areas of exceptional ecological or cultural 
value (Chapter 5). The legal standing of these technical documents varies 
among countries, but most are aspirational rather than mandatory. Settlers, 
local elites and entrepreneurs use them to identify land with arable soils 
but all too often ignore recommendations based on environmental criteria. 
ZEEs have been used in Brazil and Bolivia to identify areas that were incor-
porated into protected area systems and to bolster the claims of indigenous 
or traditional communities (see Chapter 11). 
One of the most conflictive governance issues in the Pan Amazon 
revolves around forest management. The constitutions of all eight nations 
establish sovereign (state) control over forest resources. This obviously 
covers all aspects of the management of public forests, but it also includes 
the forest resources located within private properties. To observers from 
cultures that recognise the priority of property rights, this would seem an 
aberration; nonetheless, it is a fundamental aspect of these nations’ legal 
systems.† Moreover, virtually all of the landholdings within the Amazon 
were issued (albeit provisional) deeds that recognise this legal principle; 
* Corridor Bioceanico (Santa Cruz–Puerto Saurez); Corridor Interoceanico del Sur and 
the Madre de Dios–Acre– Pando (MAP); Plano de Desenvolvimento Regional Sus-
tentável la paraa Área de Influência da Rodovia BR0163 Cuiabá–Santarem.
† This aspect of jurisprudence is linked to their colonial history when the land 
and its resources belonged to the crown, which granted concessions and use-
rights to individuals and companies. It also underpins the legal basis for the 
state to claim dominion over all underground mineral resources (Ch. 5 and 7).
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consequently, their property rights are clearly circumscribed by precedent 
and law. Regardless, human nature often supersedes legal tenets, and there 
is enormous resistance by property owners to comply with rules and reg-
ulations emanating from government agencies. 
The conflict between private property and forest governance is most 
evident in the Brazilian government’s attempts to enforce the Forest Code, 
a landmark regulatory framework first promulgated in 1936 and most 
recently revised in 2012. The 1965 version established that landholders in 
the Amazon could clear only twenty per cent of their land for agriculture 
or ranching and must retain eighty per cent in its natural state (Chapter 7). 
Landholders have the right to exploit forest resources, but they must com-
ply with a variety of management criteria.* The Forest Code was blatantly 
ignored throughout most of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, when landholders 
cleared land in excess of the legal limit, as well as along river corridors that 
merit special protection. 
In 2005, the government of Brazil launched the Plano de Ação para 
Prevenção e Controle do Desmatamento na Amazônia Legal (Action Plan for 
Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon; PPCDAm), 
an ambitious campaign to bring the combined resources of the Brazilian 
state, using ‘carrot and stick’ policies, to the reduction of deforestation. 
Directed from the president’s office, it imposed coordination across ten 
ministries and a dozen autonomous agencies. Satellites captured accurate 
and precise data in real time, which law enforcement teams – led by the 
public prosecutor’s office, with support from police, tax authorities, and 
the environmental protection agency – used to identify illegal activities 
(Chapter 7). Simultaneously, the federal government coordinated its actions 
with state governments to implement a land registration and reporting 
system that provides landholders with a flexible pathway to remediate past 
infractions of the Forest Code. Consumer boycotts reinforced these actions, 
forcing multinational corporations to implement supply chain certification 
systems eliminating production sourced from properties engaged in illegal 
activities. Coercive measures were combined with incentives such as tech-
nical assistance and financial credit from both public and private entities, 
measures that increased yields and revenues from previously deforested 
landscapes via the ‘intensification’ of production instead of the ‘extensifi-
cation’ of land use (Chapter 4). 
These PPCDAm and related actions led to an eighty per cent drop 
in deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon between 2005 and 2012, an as-
tonishing turn of events that led optimists to proclaim that deforestation 
* In the case of timber, landholders must conduct an inventory and then adopt 
a cutting cycle that ensures the survival of viable populations of each species; 
since this is not known for most species, a 30-year harvest cycle is recommend-
ed as a default.
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had been decoupled from agricultural production. The ‘carrot and stick’ 
incentive system was designed primarily for agribusiness, particularly 
farmers producing soy and beef for export markets. The most effective co-
ercive policies excluded smallholders and, consequently, did little to change 
land-use practices on the most active forest frontiers. Ranchers realised that 
the government lacked the political will to collect environmental fines and 
developed workarounds to trade cattle from properties engaged in illegal 
deforestation. Deforestation increased from a low of 457,000 hectares in 
2012 to 976,000 hectares in 2019, a value far below the 2.7 million hectares of 
deforestation registered in 2004, but analysts forecast the trend will continue 
in the regulatory environment following the elections of 2019. 
The anti-deforestation campaigns in the Andean republics never con-
templated an all-of-government effort to reduce deforestation, although, in 
Peru, a multi-agency task force has used a newly implemented monitoring 
system to intervene in a few highly publicised incidents.13 Perhaps more 
importantly, there are no corresponding global commodity supply chains 
that might motivate companies, governments, and landholders to change 
their business practices (Chapter 3).* 
The largest land set-aside in history 
The commitment to environmental governance in the 1990s was preceded 
by a civil society movement to create national parks and wildlife refuges. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Amazonian nations created a 
dozen or so national parks, thanks largely to the efforts of farsighted and 
passionate individuals with political influence. In most cases, these efforts 
were both isolated and unsustainable because governments failed to allocate 
financial resources for their management and protection. Serious efforts 
to create national protected area systems began in the 1970s as part of the 
global effort to protect nature and wildlife. International NGOs and the 
United Nations played prominent roles because they had public relation 
skills and the legitimacy to garner the attention of national governments. 
More importantly, domestic opinion supported their creation (Chapter 10). 
The first cohort of protected areas was characterised by spectacular 
examples of biodiversity and scenic beauty: the tepuis of Venezuela, the 
isolated table-mountains of Colombia and the snow-covered peaks of the 
High Andes. Academics used their knowledge, which was still rudimentary, 
to advocate for selected lowland landscapes that were exceptionally diverse 
or ecologically unique (Chapter 9). Brazil established reserves in different 
parts of the Amazon, operating on the assumption that they would be dif-
* Coffee and cacao have decentralised supply chains that lack critical points 
sensitive to boycotts, while the palm oil producers in Peru and Ecuador largely 
produce for domestic markets. Ch. 3.
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ferent and, therefore, complementary. Ecuador was the first nation to create 
a coherent national system in the early 1980s when it designated areas in all 
of that country’s major biogeographical formations. Brazil, Colombia and 
Venezuela created the core components of their national system between 
1988 and 1991, and Bolivia followed suit in the mid-1990s. The growth in 
the protected area network proceeded at phenomenal speed, catalysed by 
donations from the advanced economies and multilateral development 
agencies. Designations increased by ~10% annually between 1965 and 
1995 and by ~5% annually until 2015; as of 2019, approximately 28% of 
the surface area of the Pan Amazon had been set aside into some sort of 
state-sponsored protected area (Figure 1.8). 
Many of these new protected landscapes were home to communities 
whose livelihoods depended on the natural resources within reserves, which 
created scenarios for potential conflict and failure. The Man & Biosphere 
Program of the United Nations provided a philosophical framework for 
managing the relations between resident populations and park manag-
ers while sponsoring pilot projects in high-profile protected areas. These 
experiences informed a rapidly emerging consensus that protected area 
systems must reflect the diversity of management challenges characteristic 
of developing countries. Each country responded accordingly and created 
a plethora of categories that reflect its respective social realities and the 
political compromises required to set aside large areas within their Ama-
zonian jurisdictions (Chapter 12). 
The IUCN* provides a classification system that offers a logical 
framework for comparing the multiple different categories in six groupings, 
which include those afforded ‘strict protection,’ such as national parks and 
monuments, and others to be managed for ‘sustainable use,’ such as forest 
reserves and buffer zones around national parks (Figure 1.8). The concept of 
sustainable use reserves was pioneered by Chico Mendez, a human rights 
activist who led the rubber tapper workers union in Rondônia and Acre in 
the 1970s and 1980s. His murder by land grabbers in 1988 motivated the 
Brazilian government to create a new category of protected area, Reserva 
Extrativista (RESEX), which recognised the rights of families whose liveli-
hoods were dependent on forest and wildlife resources (Chapter 12). 
The proportion of Amazonian territories set aside as nature reserves 
varies between countries, ranging from a high of 75 per cent in Venezuela 
to a low of five per cent in Guyana. The differences are smaller than they 
seem, however, depending upon what is considered a protected area. For 
example, forest reserves that allow logging have been incorporated into 
protected area systems in Brazil and Venezuela but not in Bolivia, Colombia, 
and Peru. The two countries with the lowest designated protected area, 
*  International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN).
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Figure 1.8: The protected area network can be roughly stratified into strict protection 
areas and sustainable-use areas; indigenous territories are broadly organised into 
community-based landholdings, which tend to be smaller in area and territorial based 
reserves that include multiple communities . 
Data source: Rede Amazônica de Informação Socioambiental Georreferenciada (RAISG), 
https://www.amazoniasocioambiental.org/
Guyana (5%) and Suriname (15%) retain extensive areas within the forest 
estate (~50%) that are being held in reserve for future timber exploitation 
(Chapter 8). Some indigenous territories have been incorporated into pro-
tected area systems, while others have not (see below). Brazil and Peru also 
have large areas that have not been allocated to any management category 
or tenure regime.
The consolidation of the protected area system is an ongoing process. 
All but a few parks and reserves are understaffed, and all lack budgets 
adequate to the task of managing tens of millions of hectares of forest land-
scape. Some protected areas were created with pre-existing social conflicts 
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linked to illegal mining,* the cultivation of coca† or cattle ranching.‡ The 
goal of sustainable management is largely aspirational and will depend on 
the willingness of inhabitants to pursue livelihoods compatible with man-
agement guidelines, which in turn will depend on their ability to obtain a 
quality of life commensurate with their personal aspirations. Recent trends 
in several RESEX reserves show that families have opted to clear land and 
establish small agriculture operations because the economic benefits from 
forest-based production models do not meet their needs for cash income.§ 
In some jurisdictions, opposition to protected areas by influential constit-
uencies threatens to overturn or downgrade their status.¶
In spite of these challenges, or perhaps because of them, civil society 
groups continue their campaigns to expand protected area networks. The 
designation of national protected areas has slowed, but efforts to create 
regional and local parks, reserves, and recreational areas have increased, 
especially in the Andean republics where administrative authority has only 
recently been devolved to subnational jurisdictions (Chapter 7). Although 
local business elites support conventional development models, creating 
protected areas under local control is popular with broad sectors of the 
electorate. 
An Indigenous revival
The explosive growth of protected area networks was accompanied by 
the simultaneous recognition of the territorial rights of indigenous people, 
an ongoing process that has yet to conclude. There are approximately 2.5 
million indigenous people living in the Pan Amazon; about two-thirds live 
* Brazil: Floresta Nacional (FLONA) Jamanxim, Crepori, Itaituba-I; Area Protec-
ción Ambiental (APA) Tapajós; Parque Nacional (PARNA) Jamanxim, Río Novo. 
Venezuela: Reserva Forestal (RF) Imataca, La Paraguay, Sipapo; Parque Nacion-
al (PN) Canaima, Caura, Parima-Tapirapeco; Reserva de la Biósfera Alto Ori-
noco-Casiquiare; Peru: Reserva Nacional Tambopata; Bolivia; Parque Nacional 
Madidi; French Guiana: Parc Amazonien de Guyane
† Bolivia: Parque Nacional (PN) Isiboro-Securé, Carrasco; Area de Manejo Inte-
gral (AMNI) Amboró; Colombia: Distrito de Manejo Integrado (DMI) Macarena 
Norte.
‡ Brazil: FLONA Jamanxim, Reserva Biológica (RESEB) Nascentes da Serra do 
Cachimbo, APA Triunfo do Xingú.
§ Almost all resident families in oldest extractive reserve in Brazil, RESEX Chico 
Mendes, have cleared small forest patches ranging in size from a few to more 
than a hundred hectares and are increasingly dedicated to cattle ranching, while 
RESEX reserves in Rondônia resemble colonisation landscapes with linear de-
forestation similar to colonisation zones. Ch. 8.
¶ The state legislature of Rondônia revoked the status of ten protected areas in 
2018 as a backlash when a governor created a protected area on the last day of 
his term by executive decree rather than legislative action. Ch. 10.
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Photograph courtesy of Hermes Justiniano.
The nations of the Pan Amazonian have created the world’s largest network of nature 
reserves to protect the biodiversity and scenic beauty of places such as the Anavilhanas 
archipelago on the Río Negro (Amazonas, Brazil) and the Serranía de Caparú in Noel 
Kempff National Park (Santa Cruz, Bolivia). 
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within their territories, which total between 170 and 220 hundred million 
hectares (Figure 1.8 and Table 1.3). They have occupied and defended these 
territories for centuries; historically, they used armed resistance, but they 
now rely on civil disobedience and political activism. Being granted legal 
title or explicit use-rights to their homeland, however, does not signify an 
end to conflict. Indigenous communities must physically protect their land 
and its resources from timber thieves, gold miners and land grabbers, as 
well as wage regulatory battles to stop highway construction, petroleum 
exploration or the development of hydropower infrastructure (Chapter 11). 
Indigenous people are the Amazon’s fiercest and most effective con-
servation advocates because the struggle for their territories is existential: 
if they lose their land, they will lose their identity and cease to exist as a 
people. They know this because they are the survivors of a holocaust.
The Native Americans of the Pan Amazon have survived wave after 
wave of genocidal events that started with the colonisation of the Western 
Hemisphere by the European powers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries.14 Slavery, war and epidemic disease reduced their populations by an 
estimated ninety per cent by the mid decades of the nineteenth century. 
The prosperous communities that once populated the main stem of the 
Amazon River were not entirely annihilated; their languages disappeared, 
but survivors were absorbed, along with their knowledge, into the mestizo 
culture that now occupies the banks of the river.* 
The ethnic groups that survived with their culture and languages 
intact did so by retreating to remote territories on upstream tributaries that 
limited their contact with the agents of Western civilisation. Some tribes 
interacted with missionaries and frontier merchants, participating in the 
Amazonian economy by trading a diversity of forest products, including 
gums, resins, fibre, fruits, nuts, wildlife and fish. They were unprepared, 
however, for the avalanche of invaders who arrived with the onset of the 
first rubber boom in the last half of the nineteenth century (Chapter 6). The 
number of dead has never been compiled, but tens of thousands perished 
from another round of disease and slavery. The surviving tribes moved 
deeper into the wilderness. 
The period between the end of the first rubber boom and the nation-
alist policies of the 1970s was a time of relative calm. Outsiders continued 
to seek out indigenous communities, but they now came with benevolent 
intentions. Catholic and Protestant missionaries renewed their efforts to 
bring salvation to so-called heathen populations; their most consequential 
action was to educate young men, and sometimes women, as part of a 
deliberate strategy to assimilate ethnic groups into Western society. The 
* Along the mainstem of the Amazon River, they interbred and merged with 
immigrants who gave rise to the Cabloco, Quilambolo and Ribereño traditional 
communities. See Ch. 6.
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Brazilian government created the Serviço de Proteção ao Índio (SPI), which 
sought to ‘pacify’ indigenous groups and integrate them as distinct cultures 
into Brazilian society.* Expeditions and trading stations were manned by 
sertanistas, many of whom admired indigenous cultures and sought to 
protect them from modern society.† A third group of individuals combined 
both missionary and anthropological approaches: evangelical Christians 
organised a highly effective effort to preserve indigenous languages, rec-
ognising their essential role in cultural survival. Ironically, they used that 
knowledge to translate the bible into native languages and, in the process, 
attack the spiritual elements at the core of indigenous culture (Chapter 11). 
All three of these interlopers acted as mentors to indigenous people as 
their societies adapted to a changing world in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Each contributed to the survival of the indigenous people with 
whom they interacted; unfortunately, many exchanges triggered another 
round of epidemic disease. Indigenous people were not passive recipients 
of their ministrations, however; they absorbed some lessons while ignoring 
others. More importantly, they retained their own leadership traditions, 
which they would harness to navigate the next existential threat to their 
* The SPI was established under the leadership of Cândido Rondon, an army 
officer of indigenous descent, famous for his Amazonian expeditions and his 
philosophy of how to contact and interact with indigenous tribes. 
† Sertanistas were known for their backwoods skills and ability to live among in-
digenous communities; some were autodidact anthropologists and contributed 
information to academic studies that documented ethnic cultures; others were 
scoundrels and took advantage of their positions within the SPI to engage in 
corrupt acts. 














Brazil 174/9 708,474 428 106,906,612 8,789,287
Bolivia 33/4 244,386 94 11,711,762 7,164,531
Colombia 49/4 253,711 185 26,217,159
Ecuador 8/1 349,935 +/-200 4,095,851 3,667.168
Peru 73/4 615,555 1,500 14,568,446 5,360,988
Guyana 8/0 82,561 128 3,167,297 ~3,000.000
Suriname 10/1 25,792 50 3,424,063
Venezuela 29/4 271,996 10 1,186,539 30,580,859
F. Guiana 7/0 25,333 22 715,223
Total 340/39 2,577,743 2,461 168,568,889 56,138,396
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Photographs courtesy of Eric Stoner.
Megaron Txucarramae is a leader of the Kayapó, an indigenous nation (~8,000 indi-
viduals) that has pioneered self-governance within their territories in Pará, seen here 
addressing a seminar where forest rangers received training to combat wildfire, illegal 
logging and other types of encroachment on their territory in Mato Grosso . 
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way of life. The already considerable pace of change was hyper-charged 
by the tumult of the 1970s and 1980s as immigrants streamed into their 
territories with government assistance and the explicit intention of steal-
ing their land. Fleeing further into the forest wilderness was no longer an 
option. They had to organise and fight, or they would perish. Typically, a 
group of individuals would form an association united by ethnicity and 
language; not infrequently, they were led by a charismatic individual who 
had been indoctrinated by a Western mentor. In a remarkably short period 
of time, individual ethnic associations united to form national federations 
to represent their interests to government. This happened independently in 
Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru; simultaneously, they organised 
internationally to create an Amazonian coalition of indigenous organisations.* 
By design or good fortune, their movement coalesced at a time when these 
nations were undergoing democratic renewal and constitutional reform. By 
the end of the 1980s, the Andean republics and Brazil explicitly recognised 
the rights of indigenous people to their ancestral territories and some form 
of autonomous government.
The first indigenous territory was actually conceived as a national 
park: Parque Nacional do Xingu was created in 1961 and, at the time, was the 
largest protected area in Brazil. Its proponents, a trio of brothers who were 
famous sertanistas,† based their ambitious proposal on their observations 
that indigenous cultures are inextricably linked to their livelihoods, which 
are entirely dependent on access to forest and aquatic resources (Chapter 
11). To protect indigenous culture, it is necessary to conserve the landscape 
that supports the livelihood of the entire tribe. The park was declassified as 
a protected area in 1991 and recognised solely as an indigenous territory: 
Parque Indígena do Xingu (PIX). 
Prior to its formation, the amount of land deeded to a village or 
community was calculated based on the area required to support a family 
using slash-and-burn technology, rather than the territory needed to pursue 
a forest livelihood. Another key decision was to include multiple communi-
ties in a single reserve, which also increased the size of the protected area. 
This provision obligated different tribes, many of whom were historically 
hostile, to collaborate in the administration of their shared territory (Chapter 
10). The PIX set a precedent in Brazil, but very few indigenous territories 
were created during the military government between 1964 and 1985. The 
recognition of indigenous territories began in earnest with the constitutional 
reform of 1988. 
* COICA: Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica.
† The Villas-Bôas brothers lived among the indigenous people on the upper 
Xingu River in the state of Mato Grosso; their proposal, made originally in 1952, 
had the support of Cândido Rondon and other key military officers. See Ch. 10.
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The recognition of the territorial rights of indigenous communities in 
the Andean republics occurred first in Peru, when a military government 
initiated an agrarian reform policy in the early 1970s. The Peruvians adopted 
a community-based model that deeded land to individual villages, rather 
than a territory-based model that pooled the lands of multiple communities. 
This policy has created a fragmented land tenure map, which has facilitat-
ed the development of energy infrastructure while impeding indigenous 
organisations’ efforts to limit the expansion of the oil industry in northeast 
Peru (Chapters 5 and 6).
In Bolivia, the government of Evo Morales changed the nature of its 
territorial system, which was originally established using ethnic affinities, 
to allow new settlements by migrants from indigenous highland com-
munities. Guyana adopted a community-based approach that limited the 
forest area ceded to indigenous tribes while maximising the forest estate 
under government control. Suriname has yet to act to create any indigenous 
territories, in spite of a decision by the Interamerican Court of Human 
Rights in favour of the two largest groups,* who petitioned the court to 
seek restitution for environmental impacts linked to the bauxite industry 
(Chapter 5). Venezuela has recognised the rights of indigenous people in 
some protected areas but has yet to act on the territorial claims of its very 
sizable indigenous population (Table 1.3). 
Although Peru relies heavily on the community-based model for 
allocating land to ethnic groups engaged with modern society, it has de-
ployed the territory-based model to protect indigenous groups who are 
in voluntary isolation. Previously referred to as ‘uncontacted’ indigenous 
groups, these small bands are known to exist in Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela. Estimates vary, but there are probably less than 
10,000 individuals living in about sixty bands in the most remote corners 
of the region (Figure 1.9).15 These are among the most vulnerable groups 
within the Amazon because they are susceptible to common diseases and 
have not acquired the social skills to protect themselves from the vagaries 
of life that are an integral part of modern society. 
The people living in voluntary isolation are not the only vulnerable 
cultures in the Amazon. Approximately ten per cent of the ethnic groups in 
the Amazon have become extinct since anthropologists compiled a (more 
or less complete) list in the first half of the twentieth century.16 Cultural 
extinction is a forgone conclusion for forty groups with populations of less 
than 100 individuals, and the future is only marginally better for another 
82 tribes with fewer than 500 souls, particularly if they have not retained 
the use of their language.17 Overall, however, indigenous populations have 
approximately quadrupled since the 1970s, a positive sign that their health 
* Lokono (Carib) and Kalina (Arawak).
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and welfare has improved in parallel with efforts to secure their lands. 
Most of that growth has occurred within the fifty largest ethnic groups, 
who have been most successful in protecting their rights and prerogatives 
(see Chapter 11). 
These numbers underestimate the actual indigenous population be-
cause of migration to urban centres by youth. Urban populations are both an 
opportunity and risk for indigenous people. If they retain their indigenous 
identity, urban populations can act as a conduit for information, technology, 
education and financial resources. Unfortunately, history has shown that it 
is more likely they will lose their language and adopt the cultural identity 
of the far more numerous mestizo population. 
The revitalisation of indigenous communities has paid monumental 
dividends for Amazonian society (Text Box 1.3). Their commitment to biodi-
versity conservation ensures their territories will be managed as sustainable 
use reserves, and most adhere to management criteria similar to the most 
restrictive type of protected area. Their commitment is hard-wired into their 
culture, reinforced by recent history and the bitter struggle to defend their 
lands (Chapter 10). They are quite literally conservation warriors.
CC BY 4.0
Figure 1 .9: Most indigenous groups living in voluntary isolation live in remote areas 
on the border between Amazonian nations . 
Map courtesy of International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. Shelton et al. 2013. 
54
The State of the Amazon
Text Box 1 .3: Conservation Warriors
Kayapó: Opposed the development of multiple hydropower facilities on the 
Xingu river, confronting land grabbers and timber thieves. They have organised a 
self-defence system that serves as a model for other indigenous groups. 
Mundurukú: Have protected their lands from gold miners and maintained a 
strategic presence at the falls at São Luis do Tapajós, where they mounted a 
successful campaign in opposition to a dam that would have opened the Tapajós 
as a waterway for grain exports.
Yanomami: Mobilised public opinion, which forced the state to use the army to 
combat illegal gold mining, while alerting the world to the plight of uncontacted 
communities in the face of epidemic diseases. 
Amaerikaeri: Displaced from their lands by the illegal gold miners in the Madre 
de Dios, but continue to fight to protect their lands in the foothills.
Asheninka: Fought a long and hard battle with the Sendero Luminoso terrorist 
organisation and their allies among the coca growers in the foothills of the cen-
tral Andes. 
Moxeños: Defend their lands against a government intent on building a highway 
through the middle of their territories that would expand the settlement footprint 
for coca cultivation. 
Waorani: Led the battle to stop the expansion of oil production in Yasuní Nation-
al Park by taking their case to the Interamerican Court of Human Rights 
Ashuar: Oppose new oil drilling by the state, while suing the government in court 
to hold them accountable for the damage from oil spills caused by negligence in 
the management of a forty-year old pipeline.
Photograph courtesy of Eric Stoner.
Warriors celebrating the Kuarup, an intertribal ceremony honoring the dead practiced 
by the inhabitants of Parque Indígena do Xingu (PIX), Mato Grosso. The PIX was 
established in 1961 as the Amazon’s first multi-ethnic indigenous territory; today it is 
home to more than 8,000 Native Americans, belonging to 16 ethnic groups pertaining 
to five distinct linguistic lineages.  
Source: Povos Indigenas no Brasil, Instituto Sociamiental (https://pib.socioambiental.org/).
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Environmental economics views the environment as a form of natural 
capital: land, water and biodiversity are viewed as assets that mediate the 
flow of goods and services from ecosystems toward human society. One of 
that discipline’s most important innovations was the concept of payment 
for ecosystem services (PES), based on the observation that, under certain 
circumstances, societies are willing to pay for the provision of goods and 
services that originate from nature. The Pan Amazon is the most biologi-
cally diverse tropical forest on Earth, its forests and soils contain the largest 
stock of terrestrial carbon and it is home to the world’s largest freshwater 
resource. Nonetheless, it has been difficult to discover and implement PES 
schemes capable of monetising the value of this enormous natural capital. 
With regard to biodiversity, its value remains hypothetical until 
discovered; consequently, the market potential of the vast majority of Am-
azonian species is unknown. The foundation of the modern pharmaceutical 
industry is based on chemicals derived from plants, fungi and animals, but 
the discovery process is long, difficult and laden with risk. Similar obstacles 
impede investment by agribusiness: research to discover the economic po-
tential of agrobiodiversity is largely carried out by public institutions. A PES 
scheme for biodiversity is not an option, because the potential beneficiaries 
of an undiscovered species have not been identified. 
The value of water is easier to estimate because we consume it on a 
daily basis; nonetheless, developing PES schemes is difficult because Am-
azon has a surplus of water. It is implausible to ask consumers to pay for 
conservation in the name of water, except in a limited number of situations 
characterised by local scarcity. For example, urban water districts in the 
Andes often incorporate the cost of nature conservation in monthly water 
bills; similarly, rural communities dependent on irrigation in dry Andean 
valleys have developed PES schemes to compensate neighbors in cloud 
forest habitats that act as water towers. In all instances, the connection 
between provision and consumption is circumscribed to a local watershed. 
At larger scales, water is viewed as a free resource. 
Two recent scientific discoveries provide an opportunity for a novel, 
continental-scale, PES scheme based on water: (1) Deep convection, which 
maintains rainfall over the Amazon, is threatened by deforestation and 
forest fragmentation; and (2) the SAM transports water from the Amazon 
to the agricultural landscapes of the subtropics (Chapter 10). The combined 
agricultural economy of the Paraná-Paraguay Basin was reported as ap-
proximately $US 200 billion in 2018; productivity losses due to drought 
stress are common and translate into billions of dollars of loss in revenue. 
Unfortunately, a PES scheme is unlikely because it would require the transfer 
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of money to Brazil from a less wealthy nation (Paraguay) and a geopolitical 
competitor renowned for poor governance (Argentina). 
Fortunately, Brazil has the capacity and institutional infrastructure 
to implement a domestic rainfall-based PES programme. The federal gov-
ernment already supports Amazonian states via revenue transfers embed-
ded within the annual budget process; public expenditures are the largest 
component of the economy in Acre, Amapá, Rondônia and Roraima (Annex 
1.1). The system could be expanded into a de facto PES system by increasing 
funding for programmes known to support water recycling on frontier 
landscapes, including forest conservation, reforestation, agroforestry and 
low carbon agriculture (Chapter 8).
The potential value of forest carbon has motivated all the nations on 
the planet to create a global PES scheme based on carbon offsets.* In 2009, 
the signatories to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) agreed to implement a system referred to as ‘Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’ (REDD+). At the 
time, it was assumed the advanced economies, and possibly China, would 
agree to mandatory reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the 
adoption of a cap-and-trade carbon market to generate demand for forest 
carbon offsets. Unfortunately, the United States failed to adopt a coherent 
climate change strategy, and the anticipated cap-and-trade compliance 
market has yet to materialise. 
In the intervening period, the countries of the Pan Amazon have in-
vested in a variety of REDD+ initiatives, motivated by the possibility that 
the US would eventually adopt supportive policies. They were encouraged 
by multilateral development agencies and civil society groups that provided 
financial resources to create the necessary institutional infrastructure and to 
test modalities for investing the revenues from an eventual REDD+ system. 
This preliminary system has been operating since its inception by gener-
ating carbon offsets that have been monetised within a voluntary carbon 
market or via ad hoc agreements negotiated by multilateral or binational 
development agencies (Chapter 12). 
The Brazilian government integrated its REDD+ policies within its 
national climate change strategy and elected to monetise emission reductions 
via the Amazon Fund (Fundo Amazônia). According to the rules established 
by the REDD+ process, the decline in deforestation between 2005 and 2017 
reduced CO2 emissions from the Brazilian Amazon by ~1.5 gigatons.18 The 
Brazilian government contends those reductions should be worth ~$US 
22 billion based on a projected price of about ~$US 15 per ton of CO2. Do-
nations to the Amazon Fund have totaled $US 1.3 billion, which translates 
* A carbon offset is a reduction in emissions of CO2 or other greenhouse gases 
(GHG) that is traded to compensate for emissions made elsewhere. 
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into a carbon offset price of $US 0.86 per ton of CO2.19 Brazil has pursued 
policies to reduce deforestation for multiple reasons, including to protect 
its export markets and respond to a domestic constituency concerned about 
the Amazon (Chapter 10), but when viewed as investment in REDD+, those 
policies have not been particularly lucrative.*
Brazil’s commitment to the REDD+ system is currently under review 
by the newly elected government, which campaigned on a platform of 
promoting conventional development in the Brazilian Amazon. The two 
major contributors to the Amazon Fund, the governments of Norway and 
Germany, suspended their contributions in late 2019 to protest against the 
change in policies by the newly elected administration of Jair Bolsonaro. 
This conflict has revealed different interpretations of the REDD+ agreement: 
Brazil contends that it should be compensated for past performance, while 
the donor countries believe their ongoing contribution is based on future 
emission reductions, or at the very least, a commitment to maintain policies 
to combat illegal deforestation.20 
The Andean countries, Guyana and Suriname all participate in 
REDD+ initiatives organised by the United Nations and The World Bank, 
as well as in several binational programmes sponsored by individual donor 
countries. Numerous REDD+ initiatives have been arranged and financed 
by civil society organisations that have yet to monetise their carbon offsets; 
presumably, they are holding certificates in anticipation of a future cap-and-
trade market. As of 2020, there was no published estimate of their market 
value, although they report a total surface area of 44 million hectares.21 
Perhaps the most interesting REDD+ initiative is the Governors’ Cli-
mate and Forest Task Force, a coalition of subnational jurisdictions working 
to create a framework through which emissions reductions can be monetised 
independently of national policies.† The jurisdictional approach simplifies 
the challenges and mitigates many of the risks associated with monitoring 
deforestation, while providing a politically expedient framework for dis-
tributing revenues generated by emission reductions. In addition, advocates 
propose to add value to REDD+ by incorporating mechanisms for counting 
carbon removals that might occur due to changes in soil management or 
other opportunities created by low emission development strategies (LEDS). 
* Other REDD+ initiatives involving the Brazilian state include a project financed 
by the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to support the conservation and restoration 
of forest remnants on private properties ($96.4 million) and a programme im-
plemented by the state environmental agency in Acre to promote forest conser-
vation ($US 163 million).
† The initiative is led from California and Illinois in the USA, which seek to im-
plement climate change policies in spite of the lack of action on the part of the 
federal government. Bridge financing for the GCF-TF is being provided by the 
governments of Norway, Germany and the United Kingdom.
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Participating jurisdictions include all eight state governments in the Brazilian 
Amazon, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia (Chapter 12).
REDD+ has failed to provide the resources necessary to halt deforest-
ation, much less transform the regional economy. This failure is ascribed 
to the inability of the advanced economies to put a significant price on 
carbon emissions; however, even if REDD+ revenues were increased, they 
might not be sufficient to overcome the multiple complex factors that drive 
deforestation. Even less likely is the prospect for money to be allocated for 
the reforestation of tens of millions of hectares of degraded pastures that 
climate modellers assert is needed to stabilise the precipitation regime of 
the South American continent. 
The Challenge of the Future (and Lessons from the Recent Past)
The current development trajectory of the Pan Amazon is uncertain. The 
ongoing investment in protected areas and indigenous territories has cre-
ated a solid foundation for conservation of the region’s biodiversity. The 
dramatic reduction in deforestation in Brazil probably avoided an ecological 
catastrophe and identified key public policies with the potential for bending 
the arc of Amazonian development. Nonetheless, the momentum of fifty 
years of chaotic economic growth, disregard for the law and the economic 
power of vested interests continue to impede efforts to halt the environmen-
tal degradation that threatens the long-term integrity of the Pan Amazon.
Looking forward, multiple interrelated phenomena will determine the 
future of the region: some would support the development of a sustainable 
economy, while others would reinforce the behaviors linked to conventional 
business models. Quite a few are neutral in nature and have impacts that 
could be mitigated in a well-managed and diversified regional economy. 
They can be organised in the following four categories, based on their 
probability of occurrence and their potential to contribute to a sustainable 
future (Chapter 13). 
Things that will definitely happen 
Highway networks will continue to expand; existing roads will be upgrad-
ed; it is just a matter of time. Agricultural enterprises with overseas export 
markets will expand; this will displace some producers toward the forest 
frontier (ranchers) and motivate others to expand existing production models 
(smallholders). The extractive industries will dominate the economies of 
jurisdictions rich in mineral resources; their environmental performance 
will improve, but they will still create long-term environmental liabilities. 
Sustainable production technologies, such as aquaculture, will provide 
new economic opportunities, while selected forest products, such as açaí, 
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will become new export commodities. Initiatives to decentralise the ad-
ministrative functions of the state will empower both local elites who want 
to expand conventional production models and grassroots activists who 
advocate for environmental conservation and social justice. Urbanisation 
will continue to expand the opportunities and improve the living conditions 
of the region’s inhabitants.
Things that might possibly happen 
The management of protected areas should improve as their operations 
are incorporated into state budgets; nonetheless, political opposition may 
cause some to be downgraded or degazetted from the system. Indigenous 
communities will face challenges to protect their land; some may be tempted 
to sell access to natural resources in exchange for money. Widespread non-
compliance with the land-use zoning regulations (e.g., Forest Code) and the 
© PARALAXIS/shutterstock.com.
Río Branco, the capital of Acre, is home to approximately 50% of the state’s citizens, a 
rural–urban distribution replicated throughout the Southern Amazon where three of 
every four inhabitants reside in towns with a population greater than 10,000 . Many 
urban residents support nature conservation, but their economies are dependent on 
production systems linked to deforestation and the extractive industries .
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loss of forest remnants may diminish the convective systems that maintain 
high precipitation regimes. Consumer demand for deforestation-free com-
modities should lead to the intensification of production on agricultural 
landscapes, while community-based business models could improve the 
management of wild fisheries and decrease levels of informality (illegali-
ty) in the timber industry. Nature and cultural tourism could improve the 
livelihoods of traditional forest communities but would require significant 
investment in infrastructure, human capacity and marketing. Democratic 
reform and regulatory oversight can improve the quality and objectivity of 
environmental and social review but are unlikely to eliminate ill-advised 
investments in infrastructure or the extractive sector. Financial resources 
from PES schemes could provide critical support for the operational budgets 
for protected areas and indigenous lands but may not provide sufficient 
investment capital to reform non-sustainable business models.
Things that should never happen
There should be no new trunk highways constructed through any wilder-
ness area; there are no justifications based on economic criteria within the 
transportation sector. Large-scale hydropower facilities on major rivers 
should be eliminated from consideration due to irremediable impacts on 
sediment flows and fish migration; they are rarely economically viable 
using standard financial criteria. Global warming should not exceed 2° 
Celsius due to impacts on plant physiology, forest carbon dynamics and 
continental-scale modifications of precipitation regimes.
Things that absolutely need to happen 
The most pernicious and destructive activities in the Pan Amazon are all 
blatantly illegal, and governments must take action to bring them under 
control. Some are obvious by-products of a cultural tolerance of corruption: 
illegal logging and land grabbing. Others are the product of inequality and 
the lucrative nature of the illicit activity: artisanal gold mining and the cul-
tivation of coca. Eradicating the former will require institutional reform and 
sustained law enforcement action; the latter will require a more integrated 
approach because of the number of people involved and their willingness 
to confront the state with violence.
Current Policy Approaches: Certainly Necessary, but Are They 
Sufficient?
The consensus strategy for saving the Amazon is based on a pentad of 
self-reinforcing policies: (1) create protected areas and recognise indigenous 
reserves; (2) improve governance to combat illegal activities; (3) increase 
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market demand for deforestation-free commodities; (4) enhance the economic 
value of forest livelihoods; and (5) generate financial revenues from PES 
schemes to underwrite the implementation of the first four strategic pillars. 
Two of these policies (3 and 5) rely on macroeconomic incentives, and two 
(1 and 2) on top-down initiatives emanating from central governments. 
Only one (4) seeks to change the microeconomics on the forest frontier, and 
it focuses on a part of the Amazonian economy that does not directly cause 
deforestation. All of these policies are reliant on REDD+ and, consequently, 
the development of a robust global carbon market. 
This is not an unreasonable expectation. REDD+ provides an oppor-
tunity to mitigate global warming as well as alleviate the biodiversity crisis 
by subsidising policies that are cost-effective, timely and humane. REDD+ 
has always been viewed as an interim solution that would reduce emissions 
while the advanced economies, led by the United States, transition to a green 
economy. Unfortunately, the twenty-year delay in implementing a coherent 
climate change strategy has made REDD+ a less relevant policy tool. 
It is increasingly likely that the Biden administration elected in 2020 
will adopt a more aggressive climate change strategy that will reverberate 
across the global economy. Policies favoured by progressives call for a 
multi-sector investment and regulatory program that will rapidly transform 
the domestic economy.22 In contrast, mainstream economists prefer a fiscally 
neutral carbon tax that will allow the market to determine which energy 
systems and technologies prevail.23 Neither policy approach envisions a 
mandatory cap-and-trade system.* Moreover, many climate activists view 
REDD+ as ‘greenwash’ that would delay fundamental changes needed to 
create a zero-carbon economy, a view reinforced by the uncertainty in the 
permanence and additionality of forest carbon offsets originating in societies 
characterised by poor governance.24 
Considering the large investment made by multilateral development 
agencies and tropical forest nations, some type of REDD+ mechanism will 
be implemented. Unfortunately, that system is more likely to remain – as it 
currently is – a mechanism for channeling overseas development assistance 
to developing nations combined with a voluntary carbon market used by 
corporations to offset emissions from fossil fuels (Chapter 10). That type of 
REDD+ system would provide essential support for protected area man-
agement and assist indigenous communities but it will not be sufficient to 
transform the economy of the Pan Amazon.
* In June 2020, there were eight different legislative proposals before the US 
Congress to adopt policies to put a price on carbon; all but one are based on a 
carbon tax; the cap-and-trade bill is referred to as a cap-and-dividend system 
where revenues are returned to taxpayers and does not include a provision 
for carbon offsets created via the REDD+ mechanism. See: Price On Carbon, 
https://priceoncarbon.org/business-society/history-of-federal-legislation-2/ 
62
The State of the Amazon
The need for a Plan B: Tree-based production systems
To be truly successful, the transformation of the Amazonian economy will 
require the wholesale support of the ranchers and smallholders who occupy 
eighty million hectares of previously deforested land and an approximately 
equivalent area at risk to future deforestation. Most landholders pursue 
business models based on deforestation, none of which are particularly 
productive when viewed from the perspective of energy (carbohydrates) 
or nutrition (protein). They are, however, economically advantageous when 
viewed within the timeframes that constrain investment decisions, even 
when those decisions lead to the eventual degradation of soil resources 
(Chapter 3). If the economic logic that drives deforestation were reversed 
– if planting trees were more lucrative than cutting them down – most land-
holders would happily change their production systems. This supposition 
is essentially the business model for agroforestry, a tree-based production 
system targeted at smallholders, and for plantation forestry, a tree-based 
production system appropriate for larger landholdings (Chapter 8).
Both production models have been promoted by extension agents 
and foresters for decades. The most notable examples of agroforest crops 
are coffee and cacao, while plantation systems include palm oil and wood 
fibre (cellulose, charcoal, biofuel or timber). Agroforestry systems are rela-
tively popular among environmental advocates and the smallholders that 
adopt them. Plantation systems, however, typically attract the wrath of 
environmental activists because they have been associated historically with 
large-scale deforestation and are usually predicated on the monoculture of 
non-native species (Chapter 3). 
The preferred option of most conservation scientists is the restoration 
of forest landscapes using native species to recreate natural habitat that 
would produce, eventually, high-quality hardwood timber species. Unfor-
tunately, that business model has a pay-back time measured in decades, 
rather than years, and is nonviable without very large subsidies, which 
presumably would be provided by global carbon markets. In Brazil, envi-
ronmental advocates contend that landholders will eventually be forced 
to restore native habitat in order to come into compliance with the Forest 
Code (Chapter 7). Perhaps – but recent history has revealed the social fric-
tion associated with that policy pathway, and it certainly will not happen 
during the administration of Jair Bolsonaro.
Tree-based production systems have the advantage of restoring at-
mospheric water-recycling functionality to highly fragmented, deforested 
landscapes (Chapter 10). Amazonian producers can be persuaded to adopt 
tree-based production models, but only if there is a genuine demand for 
the commodities they produce. Several million hectares of new coffee and 
cacao plantings would almost surely swamp global commodity markets 
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and destroy the economic incentive for cultivating them. In contrast, the 
production of wood fibre has a much larger growth pathway, particularly 
in light of the recent global awakening of the impacts caused by our plas-
tic-based consumer economy. If fossil-fuel derived plastics were replaced 
by plant fibre, the potential economic opportunity for the Pan Amazon and 
other tropical forest regions would be enormous.
Tree-based production systems are not without risk, including the 
potential to displace cattle ranches to the forest frontier and the introduction 
of exotic species into natural habitats. Displacement risks could be mitigated 
using the same pentad of policy options described above, while the risk from 
invasive species could be avoided by using mixed plantings of native species, 
of which there are literally thousands of prospective candidates (Chapter 
9). The pursuit of tree-based production systems based on a commodity 
with a global market represents yet another macroeconomic solution, but 
one using a business model that responds to the microeconomic challenges 
and social obstacles that have stymied current policies.
© JBK/shutterstock.com.
Açaí is a super fruit that has exploded in popularity over the last decade due to its 
nutritional benefits. It has been a staple of Amazonian commerce for centuries where 
it is harvested from a palm (Euterpe oleracea) that dominates floodplain forest in the 
lower Amazon. Landholders have started growing the açaí palm in plantations in order 
to meet global demand for exports that exceeded one billion dollars in 2019 . 
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The Pan Amazon is a big, complicated region, and no single policy 
package will resolve the conundrum of reconciling nature conservation 
and economic development. Many, perhaps all, solutions will need to be 
local or regional in nature. Even the macroeconomic and top-down models 
favoured by policy specialists will need to be implemented in the context 
of geographically specific circumstances. This book attempts to lay these 
issues out in a systematic and logical narrative to facilitate the discovery 
of a pathway through a perfect storm of environmental mayhem to a sus-
tainable future for the Pan Amazon and all of its inhabitants.
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